Fort Hays State University

FHSU Scholars Repository
Master's Theses

Graduate School

Spring 2014

Gender-Based Stereotype Threat and Competitive
Interactive Games
Phillip Paul Robbins
Fort Hays State University, pprobbins@mail.fhsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.fhsu.edu/theses
Part of the Psychology Commons
Recommended Citation
Robbins, Phillip Paul, "Gender-Based Stereotype Threat and Competitive Interactive Games" (2014). Master's Theses. 75.
https://scholars.fhsu.edu/theses/75

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at FHSU Scholars Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of FHSU Scholars Repository.

GENDER-BASED STEREOTYPE THREAT AND
COMPETITIVE INTERACTIVE
GAMES

being

A Thesis Presented to the Graduate Faculty
of the Fort Hays State University in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Master of Science

by

Phillip Paul Robbins
B.S., Utah Valley University

Date_____________________

Approved__________________________________
Major Professor

Approved__________________________________
Chair, Graduate Council

ABSTRACT
Stereotype threat has been examined in numerous areas of performance, including
entrepreneurial intentions, negotiation, math, and chess (Gupta, Turban, & Bhawe, 2008;
Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001; Maass, D’Ettole, & Cadinu, 2008; Spencer, Steele,
& Quinn, 1999). Women who identify more strongly with their gender are also more
vulnerable to stereotype threat (Schmader, 2002). The masculine stereotype includes
such qualities as aggressiveness and risk-taking, and the feminine stereotype includes
qualities such as cooperating and nurturing (Best, Williams, & Briggs, 1980; Gupta et al.,
2008; Kray et al., 2001).
Men tend to play competitive interactive games, particularly complex board
games and table-top games, more often than women and are believed to be superior
players, possibly because the feminine stereotype excludes qualities that are considered
essential for gameplay. Nevertheless, in some games (particularly video game role
playing games), women have been found to be superior players to men by many
measures (Williams, Consalvo, Caplan, & Yee, 2009). Studies of social games show that
women are more cooperative than men in mixed-sex groups, but less in same-sex groups
(Balliet, Li, Macfarlan, & Van Vugt, 2011).
In the present study, women were expected to manifest stereotypical gender
qualities with higher frequency during a complex board game played with both men and
women than during a game played with only members of their own gender, and to do so
to a greater extent the more they self-identified as feminine according to the PAQ.
i

Women in mixed-sex groups were actually found to perform less feminine actions and
more masculine actions relative to women who played in all-female groups. A
significant correlation was found between PAQ femininity and the relative number of
feminine-typed actions taken during the game. No evidence of stereotype threat was
found, but there were signs that some type of gender-based interference occurred during
the games, causing women to behave differently according to their group type.
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INTRODUCTION
Stereotypes are a normal part of daily life in the human experience. People use
them to ease the burden of their busy thoughts by simplifying and sorting new
information into existing mental categories, allowing them to determine actions
appropriate for their situation. Perhaps some of the most common stereotypes are those
regarding gender. Social expectations and judgments about behavior appropriate for men
or women both reward conformity to gender stereotype and deter people from varying
from the norm for fear of negative evaluation (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1979).
Negative stereotypes are especially harmful, as they may lead to stereotype threat,
a condition in which people feel at risk of confirming a negative stereotype about their
group (Steele & Aronson, 1995). Even if members of a group do not believe in the
stereotype, they may still be affected by it if they believe that other people believe it.
Stereotype threat has been shown to apply to a variety of areas, including tests that are
academic, physical, cognitive, and career-oriented. Women have been shown to perform
more poorly than usual in stereotype threat conditions. Threat conditions may vary
considerably, depending on the intensity of the negative stereotype and the extent to
which members of the derogated group (women, in this case) believe that it applies to
their particular situation.
In a study on mathematics, the experimental group was told that gender
differences were expected, whereas the control group was told that no gender differences
had ever been noted (Spencer et al., 1999). Scores of women in the experimental group
1
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were significantly lower than scores of women in the control group. In chess, women
were found to perform worse when they believed they were facing a male opponent
compared to when they were told they faced a female opponent (Maass et al., 2008).
Studies on entrepreneurial intentions and negotiation have also shown how stereotype
threat can have a detrimental effect on women’s performance and motivations (Gupta et
al., 2008; Kray et al., 2001).
According to stereotype activation theory, stereotype threat can lose its power
when a stereotype is made explicit (Gupta et al., 2008). People in a derogated group will
seek to defy the negative stereotype, often outperforming those in the favored group who
are impeded due to the pressure of directly-stated high-expectations. Women who
identify more strongly with their gender are also more susceptible to the detriments of
stereotype threat, while less feminine women, or those who place less personal
importance on their womanhood, remain unaffected (Schmader, 2002).
Researchers have found that the traits linked to the masculine stereotype are:
autonomy, aggression, dominance, exhibition, risk-taking, and being rational and
assertive; those linked to the feminine stereotype are deference, abasement, succorance
(being helped or protected by others), nurturance (taking care of others), and being
emotional, passive, and overly accommodating (Best et al., 1980; Gupta et al., 2008;
Kray et al., 2001).
Men are assumed to be more proficient at complex competitive interactive games,
such as strategy board games, because the masculine stereotype includes qualities such as
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being assertive and risk-taking that are considered essential for skillful game play. In a
study of online role-playing gamers, women made up 40% of the players, were more
committed, quit less often than men during conflicts, and had in their ranks more
“intense” and “hardcore” gamers than men (Williams et al., 2009). Women played more
often than men, but they were found to under-report hours played far more often than
men as they sought to prevent negative social repercussions.
One of the major reasons for women downplaying their involvement in games can
be seen in a study by Parks and Stone (2010). They found that in a public goods game,
those who contributed the least in the group were not the only targets of expulsion from
the group: benevolent group members who contributed a great deal but used very little
were also considered undesirable. Through their excessive altruism, such individuals
simultaneously violated the expected norms of group behavior and inadvertently set their
own behavior as a social comparison that was undesirable by their companions, thus
making themselves targets of exclusion from the group’s future activities. This
demonstrates the pressures under which women operate who consider acting in a way
that is not stereotypically feminine.
Since social pressure to conform to group norms increases as group size
decreases, women feel more social pressure to conform to gender stereotype in smaller
groups than in larger groups (Kerr et al., 2009). Women are more cooperative than men
in mixed-sex groups, but less cooperative in same-sex groups (Balliet et al., 2011).
Overall levels of cooperation between men and women are about the same, indicating
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that the stereotype of women being more cooperative than men is inaccurate (Balliet et
al., 2011). In addition, mixed-sex interactions appear adequate to activate stereotypic
behavior, and therefore stereotype threat, when a relevant negative stereotype exists
regarding one sex.
Behavioral economics and game theory provide a framework for examining
gender dynamics in games and social systems. In the Nash equilibrium, players make
their choices based on their expectations of other players, and being aware of the fact that
their opponents will be trying to guess what they will do, as well (Sugden, 1989). This
provides a framework for two opposite, though not always equally viable, strategies that
can prove successful. In the correlated equilibrium, an external mediating device exists
that indicates how a player should behave (Cartwright & Wooders, 2010). Cartwright
and Wooders suggest that one such external mediating device may be gender, and that the
simple act of people identifying themselves as men or women can lead them to exhibit ingame behaviors consistent with those predicted by the corresponding gender stereotype.
Successful strategies for survival may have evolved in accordance with gender
stereotypes, increasing efficiency and benefitting the group as a whole, and with those
who exemplified their gender role best attaining the greatest reward relative to others of
their gender (Sugden, 1989).
In the present study, during a 4-player competitive interactive board game,
women were expected to manifest stereotypical gender qualities with higher frequency
during a game played with both genders than during a game played with only members of
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their own gender. They were also expected to perform more femininely-stereotyped
actions the more they self-identified as feminine according to the Personal Attributes
Questionnaire (Spence, Helmreich & Stapp, 1973; Spence & Helmreich, 1978; see
Appendix A). These results were anticipated in accordance with theories of stereotype
threat and gender conformity.
During the game, relevant actions taken by players were recorded. Feminine
actions included cooperation (working together), nurture (providing help), and
succorance (asking for help). Masculine actions included aggression (hurting another
player) and risk-taking behavior (risking a loss to try for a big gain). Following game
play, each player took the Personal Attributes Questionnaire (Spence, Helmreich & Stapp,
1973; Spence & Helmreich, 1978; see Appendix A).

This study of stereotype threat differed from others in that it explored an activity
considered recreational instead of a domain that is academic (like math), career-based
(like entrepreneurship), cognitively-based (like intelligence or negotiation), or a sport
(such as golf or chess). It had the potential to show that stereotype threat can occur in an
even wider spectrum of human interactions than previously demonstrated. Although
gender conformity behavior has been noted in social games, as well as general gender
differences in performances, this study sought to indicate the degree to which such
phenomena can occur in games that are more common in society. This study was also
geared toward aiding in understanding the depth of penetration of stereotyped gender
behavior in normal social interactions, indicating how much individual behavior can
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change based on a situational variable as simple as the presence of opposite-sex group
members.
Stereotypes and Gender
One of the earliest definitions of stereotype in psychological literature is “a
structured set of beliefs about the personal attributes of a group of people” (Ashmore &
Del Boca, 1979, p. 222). Stereotype generation is a normal part of organizing data,
allowing a person to create cognitive structures that help them better understand the
behavior of other people. Stereotyping is an adaptive behavior, allowing a person to form
snap judgments about unfamiliar people based on their group affiliations, saving the time
that would otherwise be spent studying each individual on a case-by-case basis.
However, while such a process may be convenient, it also often includes flawed
assumptions, leading to oversimplifications and faulty generalizations. It is related to the
representativeness heuristic, which, in dealing with people, is characterized by a person
fitting someone into an existing mental category according to perceived qualities, and is
based on beliefs about a group or past experience. For example, upon meeting a man
from Italy, a woman may say to herself, “The Italians I’ve known are loud and
aggressive, therefore this Italian man must also be loud and aggressive.”
In addition to influencing perception, stereotypes also impact behavior, since
actions are determined based on expectations. With regard to gender, the societal role of
a man or woman is defined by his or her sex, and personal attributes are associated with
each. The pressure of social role expectations makes behaving in a way that confirms a
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stereotype more rewarding than behavior that contradicts it (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1979).
The awareness that a person will be judged according to what is considered normal
masculine or feminine behavior is ever-present, increasing the likelihood of gender
stereotype conformity (West & Zimmerman, 1987).
For example, a man may expect women to be submissive and indecisive, and
expect men to be assertive and decisive. When interacting with a woman, he will be
likely to behave in a manner consistent with his stereotype as a man. When his options
include taking charge of planning an activity they will both do together, or asking for her
for input, he will usually choose the former, since the latter option could lead to her
assessing him as less masculine. He will also probably expect that his own actions will
be anticipated and valued. In this interaction, the woman will usually wait for the man to
propose a course of action, thus reinforcing his stereotypic expectations; otherwise, if she
presents her own ideas on an activity, she may risk challenging his views about women
being indecisive, forcing him to either view her as less feminine, or change his
stereotypic beliefs (unlikely).
Since the choice of being assertive is more likely to result in conflict, and being
submissive more likely to lead to a positive personal assessment (she will be seen as
more attractive and socially acceptable), a woman in this situation will tend to conform
rather than resist. Unfortunately, while adhering to the man’s expectations may make the
woman’s particular situation easier, it contributes in a small but significant way to the
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social pressure that will prevent her from being able to assert her own plans in the future
without encountering negative reactions.
In the previous example, not only is the woman’s behavior influenced by
stereotype, but the man’s as well. His own conception of what it means to be a “real
man” dictates his own actions. A man striving for this image may avoid interaction with
women who are independent and assertive, since such women would challenge his beliefs
about women in general and indirectly level a potential threat to his own self-concept
(Ashmore & Del Boca, 1979). Therefore, a woman who violates the pattern of
stereotypic gender behavior runs the risk of being ostracized. The dilemma here is part of
what constitutes stereotype threat, which is the threat of having one’s performance or
personal value judged based on a negative stereotype (or, in this case, the threat of being
devalued due to failure to conform to a stereotype commonly held as ideal for a particular
gender).
Stereotype Threat
The phenomenon of stereotype threat was first labeled by Steele and Aronson
(1995) during their findings of underperformance by Blacks on quantitative tests. Their
studies compared verbal test scores of African-Americans to Caucasians. When Blacks
were told that their test would be diagnostic of their ability, they were more likely to
underperform in comparison to Whites. Lower levels of performance also occurred to
some extent when they were told the results would not be diagnostic of their ability. In
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this case, the operating stereotype was the belief that Blacks were intellectually inferior to
Whites.
According to Steele and Aronson (1995), stereotype threat is “being at risk of
confirming, as self-characteristic, a negative stereotype about one's group” (p. 797).
People who perform at a lower level than they would normally due to the influence of a
negative group stereotype are victims of this phenomenon. The response of
underachievement is attributed to conscious and subconscious distress when people are
aware of the negative stereotype and are afraid of being judged by it. Even if members of
a group do not believe in the stereotype themselves, they may still be affected by it if they
believe that other people believe it.
As explained by Spencer et al. (1999), knowledge of stereotypes exists in every
corner of society, even among those who do not believe them. Because of this, those
targeted by the stereotypes are also likely to be aware of them. The threat facing such
individuals is that in any situation relevant to the stereotype, any characteristic or
behavior they exhibit that matches the stereotype will make it more plausible that their
evaluation will be judged according to the stereotype.
Stereotype threat is not isolated to conventional tests of knowledge, but has been
found to occur even in tests of physical prowess. Commonly held negative stereotypes in
athletics can prove detrimental to athletes’ performance when they feel at risk of
confirming a relevant stereotype. Some of these negative stereotypes are “White men
can’t jump”, “African Americans are not athletically intelligent,” “Whites are not
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naturally athletic”, and “women are not fast, strong, or athletic” (Beilock & McConnell,
2004). Stone, Lynch, Sjomeling, and Darley (1999) found that White participants
performed worse than Black participants on a golf putting task when they were told that
they were taking a test of “natural athletic ability.” Conversely, Blacks performed worse
than Whites on the task when they were told they were taking a test of “sports
intelligence”. This demonstrates that members of a negatively stereotyped group suffer
in performance when a test is framed as diagnostic of an attribute in which they are
considered stereotypically weak.
The idea of stereotype threat is related to the concepts of evaluation apprehension,
test anxiety, self-fulfilling prophecy, and negative thinking. In evaluation apprehension,
performance can be shaped for better or worse by one’s perception of being evaluated by
someone whose approval is desired. Spencer et al., (1999) call it “a performanceinterfering anxiety and distraction that is aroused by an evaluative audience, real or
imagined” (p. 14). Stereotype threat operates similar to evaluation apprehension, and
may even be considered by some a form of it, considering only the negative effects of
feeling judged. Stereotype threat, however, remains potent even in situations in which
one is not being observed (Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2003).
In test anxiety, a person experiences physiological over-arousal, worry, and dread
related to formal evaluation (Bruno, 2012). Expectations of underachievement can erode
self-confidence and add to the considerable stress a student feels in taking a test. In selffulfilling prophecy, people’s erroneous belief about something can cause it to occur. The
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perception of a thing as reality causes it to have real effects, and those who react in error
can cause what they fear will happen to actually occur, especially in the context of
success or failure in a given enterprise. While positive effects are possible, the selffulfilling prophecy is customarily examined for its undermining impact on performance.
Negative thinking also appears to be a major component of stereotype threat
(Cadinu, Maass, Rosabianca & Kiesner, 2005). Worry and cognitive interference, and
not emotionality, have been shown to be strong predictors of performance deficits. A
thought-listing experiment showed that women under stereotype threat listed more
troubled thoughts than women not in such a condition. The thoughts tended to be
domain-specific and not general. While an immediate difference between the two groups
was found regarding quantity and frequency of negative thought-listing, performance was
not affected until half-way through the task. This indicates that negative thoughts have a
cumulative effect, and that it is the negative thinking that causes the underperformance
and not the reverse, although the two may be mutually reinforcing.
The unifying theme of these concepts is that a belief that people will perform
poorly can impact their thoughts, feelings, and actions, interfering with their cognition,
eroding their self-confidence, and damaging their performance. In stereotype threat, this
can occur in any person who belongs to a group about which a negative stereotype exists,
whether the group be based in ethnicity, gender, religion, sexual preference, or anything
else.
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The following example of stereotype threat will help illustrate the idea. Amy is a
woman who excels at math. She is aware that a negative stereotype exists in which
women are believed to be worse at math than men. Amy takes a math test alongside
men. She suffers anxiety about how well she will score compared to them, and becomes
preoccupied with her desire to not be judged inferior simply because she is a woman.
Her cognitive abilities are now hampered by her concerns, and she ends up scoring lower
than she normally would have. Amy’s performance deficits are due to stereotype threat.
Women are the largest group that falls victim to the effects of stereotype threat. A
study of sex-trait stereotypes found that women, especially in Western society, were
thought to be weaker, less active, and to possess attributes generally thought of as less
socially desirable than men (Best et al., 1980). Although many women are happy to be
thought of as nurturing, sympathetic, and unambitious, there are numerous others who
resent being pigeonholed. Narrowly-defined sex categories hamper the ability of women
to excel in ways that may have once been thought inappropriate, and by many are still
considered unconventional, such in the areas of mathematics, science, sports, business,
and any profession involving physical danger, like firefighting, police work, or the
military. The more pressure women have exerted by others against their efforts toward
such goals, the more they are forced to endure unequal treatment because of their sex and
become the participants of gender discrimination.
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Studies Involving Math, Chess, Negotiation, and Entrepreneurial Intentions
Some of the situations in which the operation of stereotype threat on women has
been studied are math, chess, entrepreneurial careers, and negotiating. One study verified
the occurrence of women performing at the same level as men on mathematical tests
considered easy, but at an inferior level on difficult tests (Spencer et al., 1999). The
follow-up studies demonstrated that women performed more poorly than men when they
were told beforehand that gender differences had been previously shown on the test they
would take, or if there was no mention of gender differences with regard to performance.
Those who were told explicitly that no gender difference had ever been demonstrated
performed at the same level as the men (Spencer et al., 1999).
In another study, women scored significantly lower than men on word problems,
but when the same questions were given in their mathematical equivalent, women scored
at the same level as men (Quinn & Spencer, 2001). It is thought that this can be
explained by women’s difficulty in coming up with viable strategies to transform word
problems into solvable format. When stereotype threat is high, anxiety and diminished
cognitive capacity seem to interfere with the ability to formulate effective math
strategies. When subjects vocalized their process, stating what they were doing while
solving a problem and afterward explaining why they used those methods, it was found
that under stereotype threat conditions, women performed more poorly than men and
were unable to formulate strategies as often as men; in the gender-fair condition, women
were able to form strategies as often as men and performed equally well.
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In a study by Maass et al. (2008), participants played several games of chess
online. Women who were aware that they played against men dropped in performance.
Women who were falsely informed that their male opponent was a woman showed no
deficit in performance. In chess, women are not only at a disadvantage in terms of their
fear of being accused of inferior play because of their gender, but are also afraid that if
they do well, they may be considered less feminine. Interestingly, chat-line comments of
male participants tended to support this idea, as in the case of one participant who stated
that a particular female opponent was easy to beat, but his second opponent (allegedly a
male, but actually the same woman) was a much more difficult opponent.
When entrepreneurship, traditionally a masculine pursuit, was explicitly linked to
masculine characteristics by researchers, the intentions of women to enter such a career
were strengthened (Gupta et al., 2008). Under the same conditions, the entrepreneurial
intentions of men were weakened. The fact that the gender associations were made
explicit rather than implicit altered the effect of stereotype threat. Conversely, men
reported greater entrepreneurial intentions when exposed to material implicitly favoring
masculine characteristics, and women reported lesser intentions under such conditions, as
would be expected.
In a study testing gender differences in negotiation performance, the mode of
stereotype activation was shown to affect individual reactions (Kray et al., 2001).
Women told in a subtle manner that people of their gender were worse at negotiating
tended to conform to the stereotype. Women told explicitly that they would do worse
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because of their gender showed improved performance. When the gender advantage of
men was made explicit, men’s success in negotiating dropped. The explicit mention of
gender differences on how well participants would perform was the unusual feature in
this study. Men may have performed worse because of increased pressure created by
high expectations, and women may have performed better solely from a desire to prove
the naysayers wrong. They may also have decided to consciously apply more masculine
tactics, concluding that being feminine would be a hindrance to their performance.
Stereotype threat has been demonstrated in numerous settings and with a variety
of groups. It occurs when people are in a position where they risk confirming a negative
stereotype about a group they belong to, and it results in diminished performance due to
cognitive interference, and often unwilling conformity to the stereotype, as if carrying out
a self-fulfilling prophecy. Performance decrements on intellectual and physical tasks due
to stereotype threat have been noted (Steele & Aronson, 1995; Stone et al., 1999).
According to Quinn and Spencer (2001), stereotypes are activated at an unconscious level
during high-threat conditions, and attempts to suppress them take up cognitive resources
that result in underperformance during testing.
Women, the largest minority group in the world, have been shown to suffer from
stereotype threat in regard to math, chess, entrepreneurial intentions, and negotiation
(Gupta et al., 2008; Kray et al., 2001; Maass et al., 2008; Spencer et al., 1999).
Stereotypes about academic skills are generated by the culture transmitted through peers,
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media, family, and education programs (Quinn & Spencer, 2001). Gender differences
regarding math are promulgated through parents’ and teachers’ expectations.
Stereotype Activation Theory and Gender Identification
As above mentioned, the study of stereotype threat on entrepreneurial intent
(Gupta et al., 2008) revealed that people respond differently to explicit versus implicit
exposure to expectations based on stereotype. Stereotype activation theory states that
people will behave in a manner that contradicts a defining stereotype when it is stated
explicitly, and will act in a manner consistent with the stereotype when it is implied
(Gupta et al., 2008). The stereotype functions as a comparison standard that arouses
psychological discomfort.
When people are blatantly made aware of low expectations others hold of them,
they strongly react against the negative stereotype to prove that the stereotype is untrue
(stereotype reactance). Conversely, when people are explicitly made aware that others
hold high group-based expectations for their behavior, they are likely to feel
apprehensive about meeting those high standards and experience an increase in
psychological pressure that causes them to choke and perform poorly (Gupta et al., 2008).
Another factor that influences the effects of stereotype threat has to do with how
much people identify with their gender. The degree to which they conform to stereotype
under threat condition is dependent on their degree of gender identification. In a study by
Schmader (2002), women with higher levels of gender identification suffered greater
performance decrements on a math test during stereotype threat than men or women who
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identified less with their gender. Women for whom gender was a less important part of
their self-concept scored equal to men on the math test. Men performed at the same level
(or slightly better) when they identified more strongly with being male than when they
did not. Men and women performed equally, regardless of their degree of gender
identification, when not under stereotype threat conditions.
When a specific social identity is an important part of people’s self-definition, and
they are part of a negatively-stereotyped group under scrutiny in an area in which the
group is considered less able than another, they will perform worse when they believe
that their identity is relevant to their performance than when they do not. Both the
importance placed on domain and the importance placed on group membership
significantly moderate the effects of stereotype threat.
Performance differences may be part of a general automatic behavior effect of
primed stereotypes rather than a fear response related to stereotype threat (Schmader,
2002). This means that stereotype activation may result in conformity behavior as well
as having performance-hindering effects. The priming of stereotypes in a setting
examining more than simply performance on a task may reveal behavior conforming to
stereotypic gender traits. The impact of gender identification on the severity of the
effects of stereotype threat may carry over to gender conformity, as well. In other words,
as a woman is found to identify more strongly with being feminine, the more she will be
found to exhibit behavior that conforms to her gender stereotype when it is activated. In
a situation in which her gender suddenly becomes a relevant issue (such as during a game
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customarily considered to be in the domain of men), her behavior may increasingly match
what would be expected from a woman who is classically feminine (or who exemplifies
the feminine stereotype).
Gender Traits According to Stereotype
In the implicit condition for the study conducted by Kray et al. (2001), the terms
used to describe successful negotiators were: rational, assertive, and demonstrate a regard
for their own interests throughout the negotiation. Gupta et al. (2008) refer to similar
traits: aggressive, risk-taking, and autonomous. These are qualities commonly attributed
to men. The terms used to describe those who fared poorly in negotiation and
entrepreneurship were: emotional, passive, overly accommodating, caring, love to
network, and humble. These are qualities customarily attributed to women. Best et al.,
(1980) found analogous traits in their analysis of male and female stereotypes; men were
believed to be in possession of a higher degree of such qualities as autonomy, aggression,
dominance, and exhibition, whereas the female stereotype was higher in deference,
abasement, succorance (being helped or protected by others), and nurturance (taking care
of others).
Gender and Games
The aforementioned studies demonstrated that there are definite stereotypical
traits linked to masculinity and femininity. These stereotypes, and individuals’
perceptions of them, influence performance in numerous activities, including playing
board games. Among those who play competitive interactive board games, there is a
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common belief that women play such games less often, enjoy them less, and are worse at
them than men. While no formal research has been done on the subject, anyone with
significant experience can state that women are observed in far smaller numbers at game
conferences, game clubs, game tournaments, and at regular gaming groups.
The reason that this is a predominantly male activity may be due to the influence
of stereotypical gender-based traits. Because women are perceived as being weaker in
the areas associated with playing these games successfully (such as aggressiveness and
risk-taking), they may be deterred from participating. Women may be discouraged by
men because men think they will be too emotional (something men may be
uncomfortable with) and overly accommodating, which could unbalance a competitive
game and make it, in their opinion, not worth playing. Women may be discouraged by
other women who want to preserve their company for themselves and protect their
feelings (which could get hurt during a serious, aggressive game) and femininity (they do
not believe women should involve themselves in something that is considered part of the
domain of men).
Gender Differences in Online Role-playing Games
Although there may be a paucity of data on gender differences in table-top games,
there is some research on video games that have similar themes. Playing computer
games is a stereotypically masculine pursuit, yet women currently make up 40% of
players (Williams et al., 2009). MMOs (massively multiplayer online games) are a place
where people seek belonging and interaction, not just individual entertainment, as
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demonstrated by the high frequency of the message “LFG” (looking for group) sent by
new players stating their desire to find and join a group. Women were found to be more
motivated by social factors (starting and fostering relationships) than men were overall,
but men who played with their romantic partner had a far greater social motivation than
men who did not.
In the study by Williams et al. (2009), while men showed more physical and
verbal aggression than women, men were also less committed and quit more often during
conflicts. There were more “intense” and “hardcore” players among women than men.
Although women actually played more often than men, the amount by which they underreported hours played was three times greater than the amount men did, presumably in an
effort to avoid a stigma of social deviance. It is likely that despite the commonly held
gender stereotype that men are better at competitive games than women, women are
actually capable of performing at an equal level and hide their abilities from others for
social reasons.
Gender Differences in Social Games
Several psychological studies have used simple social, or behavioral economic,
games. These are rooted in game theory, which is the study of strategic decision making
among rational individuals who are faced with cooperative and competitive choices.
Many of these are zero-sum games, in which one player’s loss is balanced by another
player’s gain. These games have been run in an experimental setting investigating such
topics as social exclusion (Kerr et al., 2009; Parks & Stone, 2010), pro-social behavior
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(Dana, Cain & Dawes, 2006), decision-making processes (Sanfrey, 2007), and
interpersonal bargaining (Monterosso, Ainslie, Mullen & Gault, 2002).
A meta-analysis of studies using social dilemma games found that women
behaved more cooperatively than men in mixed-sex groups, and men were more
cooperative than women in same-sex groups (Balliet et al., 2011). Overall levels of
cooperation between men and women did not differ significantly in the studies,
demonstrating that despite their stereotype, women are not more cooperative than men.
Mixed-sex interactions are shown to activate stereotypic behavior, indicating that no
other factor need be involved for stereotype threat to occur in a test of ability related to
stereotypic attributes.
One of the limitations of the study by Balliet et al. (2011) is that social dilemmas
only reveal information about cooperation and non-cooperation, or defection—which can
manifest through a competitive motivation, but is more often motivated by concern for
self-interest. Cooperative behavior is only one half of the gender stereotype (the part
linked to women), the other being aggression (linked to men), often measured through
competitiveness. Because of this, social dilemma scenarios are inadequate tools for the
investigation of gender differences in behavior during a game.
Generally, the more members of a group are expected to cooperate, the more
cooperative each member will be (Kerr et al., 2009). Social sanctions (like social
exclusion) only improve cooperative behavior if uncooperative individuals believe that
the group has the means and willingness to impose them, and if they are costly enough to
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the targets. In experiment 1 of the study by Kerr et al. (2009), participants provided with
previous examples of game play in a social dilemma game who were in a high-threat
condition (vulnerable to exclusion) did not lower their degree of cooperation significantly
until the majority of the example group consisted of 3 “bad apples” (participants who had
contributed nothing yet still took from the community pot); as long as there were 2 or less
defectors, subjects were sufficiently deterred from defecting by the threat of social
exclusion.
In experiment 2 (Kerr et al., 2009), participants who were part of an 8-person
group contributed less than those in a 4-person group (even though the larger group’s
public contributions were multiplied by 4 and distributed evenly, while the smaller group
only had them multiplied by 2). Perceived risk of exclusion diminishes as group size
increases, due to several likely factors: increased anonymity, diffusion of responsibility,
subgroup formation, and lessened identification with the group. As applied to gender
conformity, a smaller group of women playing with men may be more likely to conform
to gender stereotype, whereas in a larger group of women, each person may feel less
pressure to represent their gender (especially in the absence of men), resulting in less
stereotypical behavior.
One of the ways in which women may be pressured to conform to the norms of
their gender is through ostracism. Parks and Stone (2010) provide timely data on the
lengths to which people will go to correct or punish behavior that is considered
inappropriate, even when it benefits the group. They found that in a public goods game,
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regarding the use of a public good and contribution toward providing it, group members
are likely to target for expulsion anyone who violates group norms. Those who give little
but take little are considered less reprehensible than those who are exploitative: heavy
consumers who contribute little or nothing. In addition, those who contribute much but
use little of the public good are also considered undesirable, and may be equally targeted
for expulsion from the group.
One reason for the desire to expel benevolent group members is that when
contributions are revealed, an involuntary social comparison is created that makes
members of the group who are contributing an average and fair amount look bad. If a
member can remove the one setting the inappropriately high standard, then they need not
change their behavior and contribute more to regain status in the group as a significant
contributor. Another reason is that the unselfish individual is simply not adhering to
group norms. They are viewed as a rule-breaker who is behaving in a way that is
contrary to fair and equitable action in the group, and they are thus targeted for exclusion
to preserve societal norms (Parks & Stone, 2010).
Gender Stereotype Conformity and Game Theory
Regarding social regulation, there are numerous ways in which stereotype
conformity can be seen as beneficial. The foremost of these include distribution of labor,
mate selection, and reproductive success. For example, failure to conform to gender roles
regarding parenting can result in inadequate resources or protection for children, resulting
in a decline in population. Because adherence to gender-based norms can be critical for
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the survival and advancement of the species, men and women may habitually conform to
gender roles, regardless of circumstance. Such conformity allows each gender to develop
expectations of the other, and to create strategies that will provide the best outcome
possible within the context of the society.
The Nash equilibrium is a well-known concept in game theory, and has been used
in explaining social behavior within the previously mentioned areas of social regulation.
It is the idea that in a group, each person will conform to a particular strategy that will
maximize their own payoff in response to the strategy anticipated by one’s opponent,
where deviation from this strategy by a single individual will result in a less desirable
outcome.
Table 1.

Player 2
Player 1

Hawk

Dove

Hawk

-1, -1

1, 0

Dove

0, 1

.5, .5

Scores:

(Player 1, Player 2)

For example, consider a two-player game in which each person is striving to
obtain a particular good, and only two options for each conflict exist: cooperation or
domination (see Table 1 above). If I know my opponent is going to use an aggressive
strategy, and that we will both suffer losses if I do likewise, I will be more likely to use a
conciliatory strategy that will restrict my losses. If he ends up being conciliatory as well,
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we can both benefit. Conversely, if I suspect my opponent will be submissive, I may
employ an aggressive strategy to take as much as I can. If, however, there is any
indication that my opponent may become aggressive, then continuing to be aggressive
will only hurt me. If the strategy I am using is the best response to my opponent’s
strategy, and his strategy is likewise made in consideration of my own, then the game is
in Nash equilibrium (Sugden, 1989).
The correlated equilibrium is a similar concept, but in this there exists some
mediating device that indicates which action should be performed by each group member
for each to benefit as much as possible (Cartwright & Wooders, 2010). In the above
example, imagine that before taking any action, a bottle is spun, with the expectation that
whoever the bottle faces will take a conciliatory action, and the other an aggressive one.
As long as each player abides by this convention, they will both be able to profit with
equal probability.
It is important to note that an interaction in equilibrium does not mean that each
party is benefitting equally. While that may sometimes be the case, there are other
instances in which one becomes stuck in a position of preventing losses or taking small
gains while one’s opponent takes larger gains, and as long as one’s opponent continues to
employ such a strategy, any change one makes will be detrimental. For example, if my
opponent continually uses an aggressive strategy no matter what I do, then the only way I
will be able to prevent further loss is to always play a conciliatory strategy, even though
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it benefits me little. Sugden (1989) uses the game of Hawk and Dove as his example of
this concept, with values shown in the chart above.
To further demonstrate these concepts, consider the following hypothetical
situation. Two men end up stranded on an island. They are from warring factions, so the
men set up camp near streams on opposite ends of the island. In the center of the island
is a bush that produces fruit every day, but only enough for one man to eat his fill. If not
eaten in the same day, the fruit falls off and rots during the night. The fruit tree is several
miles away from each man’s camp. If each of the men hike to the fruit tree on random
days, there will inevitably be some days in which there are undesirable results. They may
arrive together and have conflict, since there is not enough fruit for both. One may arrive
after the other, and find the fruit all eaten and his effort to reach the tree wasted. Neither
may visit the tree, and the fruit may be wasted. The Nash equilibrium here would be for
each man to visit the tree every other day, which may be arrived at after some conflicts
have arisen and the men are able to determine the best course of action.
Aside from arriving at a viable course of action from trial and error, a third party
may indicate the best course to take. A correlated equilibrium would involve intervention
of another factor to indicate when each man should visit the tree. For example, the island
may have a sounder of boars that alternates daily on which side of the island they search
for food. Since each man wishes to avoid a dangerous encounter, each would elect to
stay concealed and safe when the boars are on his side of the island, and visit the tree
only when the boars are on the opposite side of the island. This would create a system in
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which each man could eat his fill from the tree’s fruit every other day without harm. This
correlated equilibrium would be naturally occurring, though others may involve a
deliberately selected intervening factor or third party mediator.
According to Cartwright and Wooders (2010), one such external mediating device
may be gender. They posit that men and women may have preferences that are similar to
others of their own sex during a game. While gender may be an attribute independent of
their game-play ability, it may serve as a signal as to which actions a player should take.
They present an example of gender roles in daily life in which such roles assist in
dividing household chores equitably, such as following a household norm in which
women cook dinner and men wash the dishes. Although such a scenario may be seen to
demonstrate cooperation within a group, it also shows how each person may conform to a
particular action to get what they want (a home-cooked meal for the man, and clean
dishes for the woman).
More competitive situations may involve similar functions. For example, a man
and a woman who are interviewing for the same job may use different tactics related to
each person’s gender. During the man’s interview, he may be highly assertive and selfpromotional, pointing out his exceptional qualifications for the job and his ability to
demonstrate initiative. During the woman’s interview, she may be modest and
submissive, following the lead of the interviewer, seeking to establish a relationship
based on commonalities, and emphasizing her ability to take orders. These approaches
would be in harmony with gender stereotypes, and each strategy may give each candidate
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a better chance of acceptance than others. A man who is too submissive or a woman who
is too aggressive may oftentimes lose points with an interviewer for failing to present
themselves as expected by socially accepted gender roles.
In addition, a woman using a presentation strategy that is more masculine puts
herself directly in competition with the men; in other words, she will be judged based on
male criteria. Conversely, using a feminine strategy, she avoids lining up her abilities
with the same ones emphasized by the men, and instead offers different ones. An
interviewer who tends to favor the stereotypically feminine qualities she advertises will
choose her over the male applicants, whereas a different presentation could result in her
being turned down. Also, in the event that the interviewer prefers strengths that are
stereotypically masculine for the opening in question, the interviewer may have another
position to fill for which he believes a woman with strengths that are stereotypically
feminine would be better suited than a man, allowing her an opportunity she would not be
granted otherwise. This demonstrates some of the advantages of using a different
strategy, one that is socially-acceptable according to gender role expectancies, and some
of the disadvantages of nonconformity.
Sugden (1989) refers to a custom regulating ownership rights of driftwood in the
absence of explicitly stated laws or rules. The established norm was that, following a
storm, the first person on the beach could create a pile of driftwood above the high-tide
line and place two stones on it, and it would remain unmolested for the next two high-
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tides, giving him time to gather the wood; after the second high-tide, the wood could be
taken by someone else.
This system provided a gatherer with a reasonable amount of time to remove the
wood from the beach, and eliminated the worry of preventing others from stealing it. It
had a cooperative function in that no other gatherer would interfere with their right to the
pile until the allowed time had elapsed. This prevented a “free-for-all” scenario in which
labor was expended unnecessarily by numerous individuals rushing to collect the wood,
each failing to obtain any useful amount because of the intense competition and chaos. It
also had a competitive function, rewarding whoever was first on the beach after the
storm. This custom prevented a disproportionate number of conflicts from arising,
allowing people equal opportunities according to their initiative and industry. In
addition, Sugden refers to the “first-on” rule as a “deadweight loss” (Sugden, 1989). This
indicates that despite the possibility of more efficient rules for distribution of resources
existing in this scenario, this rule proved desirable because it effectively excluded those
individuals who were least industrious, thus permitting those investing more time and
energy to obtain a greater payout.
Sugden (1989) points out that numerous other rules for distributing the wood
could have been created, but that the extant one was fairly labor-efficient and mutually
beneficial at a group level, despite its informal development. It could have been even
more efficient, but only at the cost of reducing the reward given to the most ambitious.
In his words, “rules regulating human action can evolve without conscious human design,
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and can maintain themselves without there being any formal machinery for enforcing
them” (p. 86).
The same principle may be at work among the social mores of gender
interactions. Men and women may have developed different strategies over time as a
method of increasing efficiency (distribution of labor), benefitting the group as a whole
(survival and advancement of the species), and rewarding those who best exemplified
their gender role. These strategies may have developed spontaneously, without any
deliberate forethought or planning, in response to environmental and social pressures.
Conventions that create order in society are the product of moral beliefs, and such
beliefs serve to preserve the conventions. In most societies, a system of inequality exists
that values men over women. This is rooted in the belief that a man and woman are
integrally different in personality and intellect. Such a belief can provide grounds for
attributing different values to each gender, and thus perpetuate the system of inequality.
A belief that women should be nurturing and men should be forceful supports the
convention of treating men and women differently.
Hypotheses
There were two main hypotheses. First, it was believed that women playing
against only other women would take more stereotypically masculine actions than
women playing in a mixed-sex group. Second, women who took more stereotypically
feminine actions in either group were expected to have higher scores of femininity on the
PAQ (number of femininely-stereotyped actions and PAQ femininity scores will be
positively correlated).
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This study aimed to demonstrate that stereotype threat manifests in areas other
than tests of performance, and that it consists of more than the interfering effects of
anxiety and thought intrusion. One mysterious component of stereotype threat that is
even more insidious causes unconscious conformity behavior that confirms the feared
stereotype. In addition, the actual sentiment about the stereotype is customarily
ambivalence, and most people both fear and desire the stereotypic traits to manifest in
them. The root of this desire may partly lie in the human needs for identity and
belonging, and partly in issues related to social regulation. Because of this, even in
situations not aimed at performance testing, people will often conform to traits
stereotypic of their gender.
Studies have shown that even when men and women are accorded equal formal
status, men will be more influential than women, and women will be more easily
influenced than men (Eagly, 1983). This effect is thought to stem from the development
of gender-based expectancies in a hierarchical system in which men tend to have higher
social status than women. Long-term exposure to common gender roles in society
establishes in people’s minds an idea of appropriate gender-related behavior. Thus, even
in a setting which seeks to keep outside influences at bay, normative behavior will be
exhibited by members of each gender that confirm expectancies, men taking on a more
directive role and women taking on a more receptive role during interaction between
sexes.
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This study investigated gender-based stereotype threat as it relates to performance
and gender-stereotyped strategy patterns in a competitive, interactive, resource-based
board game in which successful strategies may be employed ranging from little to no
cooperation and high aggression, to high cooperation and little to no aggression. Women
were expected to take less actions that were stereotypically masculine when they played
in mixed-sex groups as opposed to same-sex groups due to the effects of stereotype threat
and gender conformity. According to prevailing gender stereotypes, masculine actions
include aggression (hurting another player) and risk-taking behavior, and feminine
actions include cooperation, nurture (benefitting another player), and succorance/supportseeking (asking for help).
During a competitive, interactive game, men may take more actions that hurt
other players and women may take more actions that improve their own position without
hurting others, or which benefit another player, as well (attack vs. growth). If all parties
attack or focus on growth exclusively, the game becomes unbalanced. Too much growth
may mean that none of the players are trying to achieve victory over the others, which is
one of the purposes of the game. Too much conflict means that players are continually
tearing each other down, and the victory of one party over the rest may be delayed longer
than the game designer intended, due to each being in a weakened state.
In addition, an overly competitive game can elicit anger and result in bruised
egos. Investing oneself in the game is good, as long as players do not become so focused
on winning that they forget to enjoy themselves and ruin the enjoyment of others. An
overly cooperative game may be passed without irritation or hurt feelings, but if the
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players are so hospitable to one another that they continually avoid conflict, then there is
little progress made, which may result in a much longer game than usual. In a scenario in
which players are expected to enter and resolve conflicts, but in which they are too
accommodating—either avoiding conflicts completely or else resolving them in a fashion
not intended by the game designer—the end of the game may come without any real
meaning, since the final score will fail to reflect any accurate measurement of
performance.
Having a more passive strategy is not necessarily a bad thing (as long as there are
other players who use a different strategy). Although it may seem surprising, passive
gameplay is often a viable strategy when applied correctly, especially against highly
aggressive players or when employed by a female. Because male players see female
players as merely adhering to the values of their gender, women’s lack of aggressive
behavior will appear normal to male players, and usually go unnoticed; men who exhibit
the same behavior may be suspected of having ulterior motives, or may be perceived as
easy targets and attacked early. While the more aggressive male players are battling for
supremacy, such as during a game of Risk, female players may be able to quietly stock
cards and armies in a less desirable area of the board. Once the males have seriously
weakened one another, females can then wipe up the mess and take over without any real
resistance.
There are very few games of this type that have been used in psychological
research. One of the reasons for the paucity of this type of game is likely due to the
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complexity of the game itself. Researchers tend to use simple games in order to
streamline their experiments and avoid extraneous variables that may weaken their
results. While simple games may be a useful tool to allow researchers to better
understand the basic principles of decision-making processes in economic and other
settings, the games used in their experiments are not real games; in other words, they are
not games played for fun by a large number of individuals throughout the population.
They are, for lack of a better term, “lab games”, and do not serve much purpose outside
of research and educational settings.
Since the area investigated in this case was behavior during a real board game,
complexity was a necessary element. To remove this would have reduced the game to
something less enjoyable by the players and elicited responses uncharacteristic of actual
play in a natural setting. This approach was fairly innovative, inviting participants to
immerse themselves in an interactive recreational activity while their actions during the
game were recorded. While there are a number of factors that could have elicited
aggressive or passive choices during the game (such as moods of the players, turn order,
luck, seeking retribution for actual or perceived wrongs, etc.), it was anticipated that the
overall degree of aggression and risk-taking during the game would be demonstrated to
have a basis primarily in the gender of each participant and their opponents.
To determine the presence of stereotype threat during a game, it was important to
avoid stereotype reactance. Therefore, during the experiment, there was no mention of
gender differences with regard to aptitude or performance on the game. If the belief that
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competitive strategy games are primarily a masculine pursuit was part of a generally held
stereotype, then women who were aware of such a belief should have experienced some
of the deleterious effects of stereotype threat.
As with other studies that have examined the performance of individuals in
stereotype threat conditions, this study had the additional aim of examining the degree of
gender role conformity. If pressure to conform to gender roles existed in a mixed-gender
group playing a game typically viewed as favoring men, then women would behave in
ways that were more stereotypically feminine, and men in ways that were more
masculine, when they played together rather than with their own gender (although in this
study, groups composed entirely of men were not examined).
While overall performance of each participant was noted, particular interest lied
in the ratio of masculine to total stereotyped actions taken by each subject during the
game. Women who took less masculine actions compared to total stereotyped actions
during a game played against men than women who played against other women were
seen to have conformed their behavior to what was considered acceptable for their
gender. This conformity was viewed as a response to the stereotype threat condition
inherent in the situation. In addition to underperforming as a result of stereotype threat,
women may have chosen to conform out of a desire to be like other women, to protect
their feminine image, or to bring attention to their difference as women from the players
who were men. It is anticipated that for many women, submissive behavior during the
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game was associated with both the fear of being negatively judged, as well as the desire
to demonstrate acceptable traits of their gender.
It was also expected that women who conformed to their stereotype in this way
would also show performance deficits due to their reluctance to utilize actions that could
help them during the game but which would be considered masculine in nature. In
addition, concern over their possible inability to perform at a level comparable to the men
against whom they competed could have undermined their ability to choose actions of
greatest benefit to them, thereby resulting in a lower score than when they played against
other women only.
In a mixed-sex game, as long as women performed at approximately the same
level as the men, the average scores of both genders were expected to be equivalent. If,
however, women were being impeded in their gameplay due to stereotype threat, this
would manifest in their scores, causing the average score of women in such a game to be
significantly lower than the average score of men.
It was believed that the PAQ scores of each participant would show a strong
correlation to the type of action taken during the game. Women’s femininity scores on
the PAQ were expected to predict the number of stereotypically feminine actions they
performed during the game: the higher the femininity score, the more stereotypical
feminine actions taken. Women who scored higher on masculinity were thought likely
demonstrate more masculine and fewer feminine actions than those who scored lower on
masculinity.
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Hypothesis 1: The ratio of masculine actions to total stereotyped actions taken by
women during the game was expected to vary depending on the presence of men in their
group. Women in groups without men present were expected to take a significantly
greater number of masculine actions compared to total stereotyped actions than women in
groups with men.
Hypothesis 2: The ratio of feminine to total stereotyped actions taken by women
was expected to change depending on whether men were part of the group. Women in
groups without men present were expected to take a significantly fewer number of
feminine actions compared to total stereotyped actions than women in groups with men.
Hypothesis 3: Women’s femininity scores on the PAQ were expected to predict
their feminine action ratios. Women with higher femininity scores were expected to
perform more feminine actions compared to total stereotyped actions than women with
lower femininity scores.
Hypothesis 4: Women’s masculinity scores on the PAQ were expected to predict
their masculine action ratios. Women with higher masculinity scores were expected to
perform more masculine actions compared to total stereotyped actions than women with
lower masculinity scores.
Hypothesis 5: In mixed-sex groups, women were expected to perform worse than
men. The scores of women in mixed-sex groups were expected to be significantly lower
than the scores of men.

38
Hypothesis 6: Women’s masculine action ratios were expected to predict their
game scores. Women who took more masculine actions compared to total stereotyped
actions were expected to perform better than women who took less.
Hypothesis 7: In mixed-sex games, men were expected to win significantly more
often than women.
Hypothesis 8: In mixed-sex games, the scores of men were expected to be
significantly higher than the scores of women.
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METHOD
Participants
Participants included 78 adult students from Fort Hays State University (n = 23
men, n = 55 women). Both undergraduates and graduate students were sampled (n = 58
undergraduate students, n = 20 graduate students). Of the women, who were of particular
interest to this study, 28 were assigned to the same-sex group condition, and 27 to mixedsex groups. The youngest participant was 18, and the oldest was 31, with the mean age
being 20.81 years (SD = 3.24). Most of the participants were White, with about 11%
from other ethnic groups. Participants had diverse majors. About 77% of the
participants majored in psychology, biology, English, education, nursing, radiology, or
athletic training; around 14% had other majors and 9% were undecided.
In examining gender roles according to the PAQ, it was found that among
women, about 49% were feminine, 6% masculine, 18% androgynous, and 27%
undifferentiated. Among men, about 17% were feminine, 22% masculine, 30%
androgynous, and 30% undifferentiated. Compared to gender roles found in other
studies, this study found somewhat more feminine females and considerably less
masculine females than average (Schneidhofer, Schiffinger, Mayrhofer, 2010; Stoltzfus,
Nibbelink, Vredenburg, & Thyrum, 2011). Proportions of other gender roles of females
and of the gender roles of males were found to be comparable to those found in other
studies (see Appendix B).
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In addition to participants, there were 14 substitutes who assisted the
experimenter, 7 men and 7 women. Four of them (women) played in the same-sex
condition, and 10 (3 women and 7 men) played in the mixed-sex condition. The use of
substitutes allowed groups to assemble when insufficient participants were present. They
consisted of individuals who had previously participated or who were not qualified to
participate. Most of those who were unqualified were individuals who had stated that
they had “a lot of experience” with the original game (Settlers of Catan) that the
experimental game was created from, or who had stated that they had “a moderate
amount of experience” and had played “within the last year”. The researcher kept these
individuals separate in the data from regular participants in an attempt to control for
unwanted variables.
Substitutes were told to play normally, but with some exceptions: they were to
take a greater variety of action types than they might otherwise take in order to both
model the actions and prevent bias toward a particular action type. They were also told
not to play overly aggressively (using sabotage actions too often), and to focus less on
winning and more on their role as substitute, providing a setting in which the other
players could perform naturally.
Those younger than 18 and older than 65 were excluded. In addition, anyone who
reported being “Very experienced” at the game, Settlers of Catan, or who reported being
“Moderately experienced” and had played it within the last year, were excluded (see
Appendix C: Screening Questions). Participants were recruited through the invitation of
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students by the experimenter or their instructor in psychology and English classes, and
each completed the Informed Consent Form (see Appendix D) prior to participation.
Many students were offered extra credit by their instructors as an incentive to volunteer
for the study, whereas others participated as partial fulfillment of curriculum
requirements for their class.
Materials and Apparatus
Before taking part in the experiment, prospective participants filled out the
Screening Questions. Those who were sufficiently unfamiliar with the original Settler of
Catan game, upon which the experimental game was based, were accepted as participants
and allowed to proceed; those who were too experienced with the game were debriefed
and dismissed. In this way each player could participate on roughly equal ground, and
the introduction of extraneous variables could be avoided. Participants who qualified
also filled out a Demographics Questionnaire before proceeding (see Appendix E). The
games were played in-person and on-campus in a private room. Prior to playing the
game, participants had the rules and mechanics of Frontier Town explained to them by
the primary researcher (see Appendix F). Each player was handed a copy of the
Individual Player Rules Sheet for Frontier Town (see Appendix G) as a convenient
reference during the game.
As part of the game, on each of their turns, the participants took a Special Action.
Each Special Action correlated with stereotypic feminine or masculine traits or was
gender-neutral. The Special Actions of the players were recorded on a worksheet by a
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researcher sitting nearby. Following each game, participants were given a copy of the
Personal Attributes Questionnaire (Spence, Helmreich & Stapp, 1973; Spence &
Helmreich, 1978; see Appendix A). After completing the PAQ, each participant was
given a Debriefing Form (see Appendix H) and invited to ask questions about the study.
Instruments
The game used in the experiment, Frontier Town (see Appendix F), is a variation
of the board game Settlers of Catan, by Klaus Teuber. Permission to use this variation of
the game for personal and educational purposes was granted by his son, Guido Teuber,
managing director of Catan GmbH/LLC. It is a simplified version of the game adapted to
fit the purposes of the experiment, with modified rules and Special Actions added. The
primary purpose of the game is to provide an atmosphere similar to that usually found
playing competitive interactive board games while enabling the experimenter to measure
the number of feminine and masculine-typed actions taken by players during the game.
The special actions are classified as feminine, masculine, or gender-neutral, depending on
the traits associated with the action. Feminine actions are those with the associated traits
of cooperation, nurture (helping), or succorance (asking for help)—which will be referred
to as support-seeking; masculine actions are those with the associated traits of aggression
(hurting another player) or risk-taking behavior (Best et al., 1980; Gupta et al., 2008;
Kray et al., 2001).
Following the game, participants were asked to take the Personal Attributes
Questionnaire (PAQ), designed by Spence, Helmreich and Stapp (1973; Spence &
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Helmreich, 1978; see Appendix A). This survey measures stereotypical masculinity and
femininity based on individual adherence to traits. In the PAQ, participants are asked to
describe how strongly they identify with different adjectives by circling a number (1
through 5) along a continuum. Masculinity in the PAQ is defined as being self-assertive
or instrumental, and femininity as being expressive or interpersonal. The PAQ contains
only 3 factors, one for each scale—M, F, and M-F (masculine, feminine, and
androgynous).
As is customary, the androgyny subscale was not scored; it is considered the least
reliable of the scales. The M and F scales have shown to be acceptable in reliability. In a
study by Helmreich, Spence and Wilhelm (1981), Cronbach alphas above .70 were found
for the two scales when the PAQ was administered to adults (parents and college
students); the lowest alpha found was .67 for male high school students on the M scale.
In a study of various sex role instruments, the PAQ was among those found to have high
reliability and homogeneity (Wilson & Cook, 1984). In factor analysis of these
instruments, the largest factors found were expressivity and instrumentality, which are
explicitly represented in the PAQ and are considered core components of masculinity and
femininity in other measures (Wilson & Cook, 1984).
Before the game, participants took a brief Demographics Questionnaire (see
Appendix E). This was to collect general information about each participant, and also
served to subtly prime participants for stereotype threat by reminding them of their sex.
Before this, each participant also answered the Screening Questions; any who did not
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qualify were removed from the experiment. The Screening Questions determined a
person’s eligibility to participate in the study. Those who played too recently or who
were too experienced in Settlers of Catan were excluded in order to avoid significant
disparity in skill level among participants and to reduce the impact of extraneous
variables. Those who marked in the Screening Questions that they had a lot of experience
with Settlers of Catan, or who marked that they had a moderate amount of experience and
had played within the last year, were excluded from proceeding further in the study.
Pilot Test
A pilot test was run prior to experimentation in order to be sure that the game
functioned smoothly and as intended. Participants were selected by the researcher and
completed the Informed Consent Form for Pilot Study (see Appendix I). Two
independent observers took note of each of the Special Actions taken by each player,
rating the degree to which they considered the action in its context as aggressive and/or
risk-taking, and therefore stereotypically masculine, or nurturing, cooperative, and/or
support-seeking, and therefore feminine, or whether they considered it none of the above,
and therefore neutral. Several games were run and any necessary adjustments made to
correct problems and establish interrater agreement.
In the final test for validity and interrater reliability in the measure Frontier Town,
two researchers observed a game and recorded whether they believed a Special Action
was feminine, masculine, or gender-neutral. The primary researcher was well acquainted
with the measure; the second researcher was instructed beforehand on how each
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stereotyped action was connected to stereotypic attributes of masculinity or femininity.
During the assessment, each time a player took a Special Action, each researcher would
record whether such an action appeared to be aggressive or risk taking (and hence
masculine); cooperative, nurturing, or support-seeking (and therefore feminine); or for
general self-improvement (and therefore gender-neutral). Cohen’s Kappa was 1.00, as
the researchers were in agreement 100% of the time. Therefore, according to the results
of this test of interobserver reliability, the measure was found to be perfectly reliable and
valid.
Procedure
In order to avoid explicit stereotype activation, participants were not told
beforehand that the purpose of the study was to examine gender-based stereotype threat.
They were told only that the study examined possible relationships between personal
attributes and game play behavior. However, in order to subtly prime subjects to think in
terms of their gender, and thus make stereotype threat easier to see, participants were
asked to complete a brief demographics questionnaire immediately prior to playing,
which required them to state their biological sex.
Participants were pre-assigned by the researcher to either a same-sex group of
four women or a mixed-sex group with two men and two women. Each participant was
informed by email regarding the time they would meet to participate in the experiment,
based on their pre-stated availability. When participants met to participate, each read and
signed the Informed Consent Form, which was placed by the researcher in an envelope.
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Participants drew an ID # to use instead of their name on the remaining forms. They
filled out the Screening Questions. Those who did not qualify were handed a Debriefing
form and dismissed. If more than the necessary number remained who were qualified,
those who would play were determined by ID # (lowest numbers chosen to participate
first) and the others were debriefed and dismissed. Participants completed the
Demographics Questionnaire and had the game described to them by the researcher.
Each participant was given a copy of the Individual Player Rules Sheet for Frontier Town
(see Appendix G). A researcher was nearby for further guidance throughout the course
of the game.
During the game, the researcher watched from a chair nearby, observing and
recording each of the special actions taken by each player. Some actions were designed
to reflect a gender-based trait, such as risk-taking, aggression, helpfulness, cooperation,
or submission; other actions were considered gender-neutral. Following the game,
participants completed the Personal Attributes Questionnaire (see Appendix A). After
this, they were given a Debriefing form (see Appendix H) and invited to ask questions
about the study.
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RESULTS
Data was collected by the researcher on the number of masculine-typed actions,
feminine-typed actions, and gender-neutral actions taken by each player during each
game. Other factors were also recorded, such as total number of actions, score,
placement, and trends observed during the study. Every time a player took a Special
Action, the observing researcher marked a tally in the appropriate box. Table 2 below
shows the sheet that was used to record each player’s actions. 1M, 1F, 2M, and 2F are all
players in this example. Actions marked (F) are feminine, (M) are masculine, and (N) are
neutral. This is an example of how each player may have spent their Special Actions
over the course of twelve full rounds of play.
Table 2.

The experiment investigated numerous variables, primarily targeting women. The
first two hypotheses were tied together, and actually formed the basis of the first
fundamental hypothesis: the expectation that women in mixed-sex groups would, due to
stereotype threat, perform fewer masculine-typed actions and more feminine-typed
actions than their counterparts (women in same-sex groups), and that conversely, women
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in same-sex groups would perform more masculine-typed actions and fewer femininetyped actions comparatively. This was expected to occur because of gender-conformity
pressures, which would be heightened by stereotype threat.
The first hypothesis was that women in groups without men would take a
significantly greater number of masculine actions compared to the total number of
stereotyped actions (both masculine and feminine together) than women in groups with
men present. The independent variable was whether a participant was assigned to play as
part of a mixed-sex or same-sex group. The dependent variable was the masculine action
ratio, which was ratio of the number of masculine actions divided by the number of total
stereotyped actions (masculine actions + feminine actions) multiplied by 100. In order to
test hypothesis 1, an independent samples t-test was conducted to determine if mean
masculine action ratios taken by women in same-sex groups (n = 28) were significantly
higher than those taken by women in mixed-sex groups (n = 26).
One of the women in the mixed-sex condition was excluded from analyses
examining masculine and feminine action ratios due to high play abnormality (failing to
take any stereotyped actions). Levene’s test indicated that variances were not equal,
F(52) = 5.87, p < .05. Women in same-sex groups were not found to have significantly
higher masculine action ratios than women in mixed-sex groups, t(48.82) = -1.99, p =
.97, one-tailed. Masculine action ratios of women in same-sex groups (M = 56.55, SD =
37.39) were lower by 17.50 than masculine action ratios of women in mixed-sex groups
(M = 74.00, SD = 26.63).
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If this test had been two-tailed, the difference would have been very close to
significance (p = .05). After making this observation, a follow-up test was performed. A
one-tailed independent samples t-test examined whether masculine action ratios taken by
women in mixed-sex groups (n = 26) were significantly higher than those taken by
women in same-sex groups (n = 28). Levene’s test indicated that variances were not
equal, F(52) = 5.87, p < .05. Women in mixed-sex groups had significantly higher
masculine action ratios than women in same-sex groups, t(48.82) = 1.99, p < .05, onetailed. Masculine action ratios for women in mixed-sex groups (M = 74.00, SD = 26.63)
were higher by 17.50 than those of women in same-sex groups (M = 56.55, SD = 37.39).
This demonstrates that women in mixed-sex groups were actually more likely to take
masculine-typed actions relative to total stereotyped actions than women in same-sex
groups. Figure 1 below shows the difference between the groups.
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Figure 1.

The second hypothesis was that women in groups without men present would take
a significantly fewer number of feminine actions compared to the total number of
stereotyped actions than women in groups with men. The independent variable was
playing as part of a mixed-sex or same-sex group. The dependent variable was the
feminine action ratio, which was the ratio of the number of feminine actions divided by
the number of total stereotyped actions x100.
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To test this, an independent samples t-test sought to determine whether feminine
action ratios of women in same-sex groups (n = 28) were significantly lower than those
of women in mixed-sex groups (n = 26). Levene’s test indicated that variances were not
equal, F(52) = 5.87, p < .05. Results showed that women in same-sex groups did not
have significantly lower feminine action ratios compared to women in mixed-sex groups,
t(48.82) = -1.99, p = .97, one-tailed. Feminine action ratios of women in same-sex
groups (M = 43.54, SD = 37.39) were higher by 17.50 than feminine action ratios of
women in mixed-sex groups (M = 25.00, SD = 26.63).
A two-tailed test would have been borderline significant in this case, as well (p =
.05). Another one-tailed independent samples t-test served as a follow-up for hypothesis
2. It tested whether feminine action ratios of women in same-sex groups (n = 28) were
significantly higher than those of women in mixed-sex groups (n = 26). Levene’s test
indicated that variances were not equal, F(52) = 5.87, p < .05. Results showed that
women in same-sex groups did have significantly higher feminine action ratios compared
to women in mixed-sex groups, t(48.82) = 1.99, p < .05, one-tailed. Means of feminine
action ratios of women in same-sex groups (M = 43.54, SD = 37.39) were higher by
17.50 than means of feminine action ratios of women in mixed-sex groups (M = 25.00,
SD = 26.63). This demonstrates that women in same-sex groups were actually more
likely to take feminine-typed actions relative to total stereotyped actions than women in
mixed-sex groups. Figure 2 below shows the difference between the groups.
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Figure 2.

The third and fourth hypotheses represented the second fundamental hypothesis:
that femininity and masculinity as measured by the PAQ would indicate the ratios of
feminine and masculine actions taken during the game. More feminine women would
take more feminine actions compared to the total number of stereotyped actions, and
more masculine women would take more masculine actions comparatively.
In evaluating the third hypothesis, to determine whether female participants’ (n =
55) femininity scores (M = 23.60, SD = 3.97) from the PAQ predicted their feminine
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action ratios (M = 35.05, SD = 33.53), a bivariate regression was conducted. It was
anticipated that scores in X (femininity) would predict scores in Y (feminine action ratio).
A scatterplot analysis was performed, showing a positive linear relationship between X
and Y with one outlier, R2 = .08 (see Figure 3 below). Correlation of the variables was
significant, Adjusted R2 = .06, r(54) = .28, p < .05. The ANOVA that was run showed
that the regression equation was significant, F(1, 52) = 4.30, p < .05, R2 = .08, Adjusted
R2 = .06. The regression equation predicting female participants’ feminine action ratio
from femininity was Y’ = -20.51 + 2.35 X. For every 1 increase in X (femininity), there
was a corresponding increase in Y (feminine action ratio) by 2.35.
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Figure 3.

In assessing the fourth hypothesis, to find out if female participants’ (n = 55)
masculinity scores (M = 20.00, SD = 4.42) from the PAQ predicted their masculine action
ratios (M = 64.95, SD = 33.53), a bivariate regression was conducted. It was anticipated
that scores in X (masculinity) would predict scores in Y (masculine action ratio). A
scatterplot analysis was performed, showing no significant linear relationship between X
and Y (R2 = .00). Correlation of the variables was not significant (r(54) = .00, p > .05).
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The ANOVA that was run showed that the regression equation was not significant (F(1,
52) = .02, p > .05). Masculinity scores of women did not predict masculine action ratios.
The fifth hypothesis was that women who played against men would perform
significantly worse (have lower scores) than women who played only against other
women. The independent variable was whether women played a mixed-sex or same-sex
game. The dependent variable was the score at the end of the game. This hypothesis was
also supposed to be a measure of stereotype threat, demonstrating that overall, women
who played against other men suffered in performance. An independent samples t-test
was conducted to determine if female participants in the mixed-sex group (n = 27) had
significantly lower scores than female participants from the same-sex group (n = 28).
Mean scores of women in the mixed-sex condition (M = 7.74, SD = 1.68) were not found
to be significantly lower than mean scores of women in the same-sex condition (M =
8.07, SD = 1.61), t(53) = .75, p = .23, one-tailed.
The sixth hypothesis was that women who took more masculine actions compared
to total stereotyped actions would perform better than women who took less. This
hypothesis was meant to link the first two hypotheses with the fifth. If stereotype threat
occurred, women playing men should have lower scores; in addition, they should
demonstrate gender-role conformity (by comparatively performing more actions of their
own gender-type), falling into a stereotypical feminine role in order to be viewed
positively and avoid negative evaluation.
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To find out if a female participant’s (n = 55) masculine action ratio (M = 64.95,
SD = 33.53) predicted their game score (M = 7.91, SD = 1.64), a bivariate regression was
conducted. It was anticipated that scores in X (masculine action ratio) would predict
scores in Y (game score). A scatterplot analysis was performed, showing no significant
linear relationship between X and Y (R2 = .05). Correlation of the variables was not
significant (r(54) = .05, p > .05). The ANOVA that was run showed that the regression
equation was not significant (F(1, 52) = .12, p > .05). No relationship appeared to exist
between women’s masculine action ratio and game score.
The final two hypotheses were the only ones that took into account the
performance of the males in the study. They represent the fundamental hypothesis that
men, who were expected to have higher masculinity scores than women on the PAQ and
to perform more masculine-typed actions during the game, would score higher overall,
and win more often than women in mixed-sex groups.
The seventh hypothesis was that in mixed-sex games, men would win
significantly more often than women. A chi-squared test was run to see if males (n = 23)
won more often than female participants (n = 27) from mixed-sex groups. Of those who
did not win, 21 (57%) were women, and 16 (43%) were men. Among the winners, 6
(46%) were women, and 7 (54%) were men. Six out of 27 women won (22%), while 7
out of 23 men did (30%). Men were not found to win significantly more often than
women, χ2 (1, n = 50) = .44, p = .25, one-tailed.
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The eighth hypothesis was that the scores of men would be significantly higher
than the scores of women. An independent samples t-test compared scores of male
participants (n = 23, M = 7.61, SD = 1.97) with scores of female participants (n = 27, M =
7.74, SD = 1.68). Men were not found to have significantly higher scores than women,
t(48) = .13, p = .75, one-tailed.
Results of Supplemental Tests
Since women in mixed-sex groups were found to perform more masculine actions
than expected, an independent samples t-test was run for participants in the mixed-sex
condition to conclude whether women (n = 26) had higher masculine action ratios than
men (n = 23). Women (M = 74.00, SD = 26.63) were not found to have significantly
higher masculine action ratios than men (M = 63.08, SD = 34.56), t(47) = 1.25, p = .11,
one-tailed.
Another independent-samples t-test was run to see if men (n = 23) had higher
feminine action ratios than women (n = 26). Men (M = 36.92, SD = 34.56) were not
found to have significantly higher feminine action ratios than women (M = 26.00, SD =
26.63), t(47) = 1.25, p = .11, one-tailed.
In connection with tests run for the third hypothesis, a correlation was run for
feminine action ratios and femininity of females in the same-sex condition (n = 28). A
moderate correlation was found, but was not determined to be significant, r(27) = .31, p =
.11.
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Another correlation was run for feminine action ratios and femininity of females
in the mixed-sex condition (n = 27). Once again, a moderate correlation was found that
was not determined to be significant, r(26) = .32, p = .12.
A correlation was calculated for PAQ femininity and game score of women in the
mixed-sex condition (n = 27). No significant correlation was found, r(26) = .04, p = .85.
A correlation was also calculated for PAQ femininity and game score of women
in the same-sex condition (n = 28). No significant correlation was found, r(27) = .09, p =
.65.
An independent samples t-test was run comparing the PAQ femininity scores of
women in same-sex groups with those of women in mixed-sex groups. No significant
difference was found, t(53) = -.39, p > .05, two-tailed. Women in same-sex groups (M =
23.39, SD = 4.43) did not have significantly different scores from women in mixed-sex
groups (M = 23.81, SD = 3.50).
In order to see if any significant difference existed between the scores of male
participants (n = 23) and females from the same-sex groups (n = 28), an independent
samples t-test was run. The results did not show a significant difference, t(49) = .92, p >
.05, two-tailed. Males (M = 7.61, SD = 1.97) did not score significantly differently than
females from the same-sex condition (M = 8.07, SD = 1.61).
An independent samples t-test was also conducted to see if any difference existed
between the scores of males (n = 23) and females in the mixed-sex condition (n = 27).
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Once again, no significant difference was found, t(48) = .26, p > .05, two tailed. Scores
of males (M = 7.61, SD = 1.97) did not differ significantly from scores of females in
mixed-sex groups (M = 7.74, SD = 1.68).
Males who won (n = 7) were expected to have higher masculine action ratios than
males who did not win (n = 16), and an independent samples t-test was performed to
determine if this was the case. Levene’s test was significant (F = 5.28, p < .05). Males
who won (M = 79.27, SD = 20.51) were shown to have significantly higher masculine
action ratios than males who did not win (M = 55.99, SD = 37.51), t(21) = -1.91, p < .05,
one-tailed.
A second t-test of this type was performed including substitutes. Masculine
action ratios of males who won (n = 9) were compared with those of males who did not
win (n = 21). The difference found was very near significance, t(28) = -1.70, p = .05,
one-tailed. Males who won (M = 78.32, SD = 17.86) had near significantly higher
masculine action ratios than males who did not win (M = 58.28, SD = 33.15).
To determine whether a difference existed between masculine action ratios of
women who won (n = 14) and women who did not win (n = 40), another independent
samples t-test was performed. There was no significant difference, t(52) = -.21, p > .05.
Masculine action ratios of women who won (M = 66.55, SD = 29.97) did not vary
significantly from those of women who did not win (M = 64.39, SD = 35.03).
An independent samples t-test was run to see if women who won in mixed-sex
groups (n = 6) had higher masculine action ratios than women who won in same-sex
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groups (n = 8). Women who won in mixed-sex groups (M = 77.50, SD = 20.43) were not
found to have significantly higher masculine action ratios than women who won in samesex groups (M = 58.33, SD = 34.50), t(12) = 1.30, p = .12, one-tailed.
A correlation was calculated for score and masculine action ratio of women in
mixed-sex groups (n = 26). A moderate correlation was found, but it was not determined
to be significant, r(25) = .24, p = .12, one-tailed. When a partial correlation was run for
score and masculine action ratio of women in mixed-sex groups (n = 26) accounting for
winners, an even higher moderate correlation was found that was closer to being
significant, r(23) = .27, p < .10, one-tailed.
A correlation was run for score and masculine action ratio of men in mixed-sex
groups (n = 23). A moderate correlation was found that was very nearly determined to be
significant, r(22) = .34, p = .05, one-tailed.
Another correlation was run for score and masculine action ratio of women in
same-sex groups (n = 28). No correlation was found, r(27) = -.03, p > .05. The
correlation for score and feminine action ratio was likewise not significant, r(27) = .03, p
> .05.
Male winners (n = 7) were expected to have higher masculine action ratios than
female winners (n = 14), and were compared using an independent samples t-test. Male
winners (M = 79.27, SD = 20.51) did not have significantly higher masculine action ratios
than female winners (M = 66.55, SD = 29.97), t(19) = 1.01, p = .16, one-tailed.
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An independent samples t-test was done to compare masculine action ratios of all
winners, including substitutes (n = 23) with those of all non-winners (n = 68). No
significance was found, t(89) = -1.13, p = .26. Those who won (M = 71.16, SD = 26.10)
did not show significantly higher masculine action ratios than non-winners (M = 62.61,
SD = 32.92).
In connection with the seventh hypothesis, a chi-squared test was run to see if a
significant difference existed between males (n = 30) and females (n = 30) from mixedsex groups, including substitutes, in terms of win frequency. Of those who did not win,
24 (53%) were women, and 21 (47%) were men. Among the winners, 6 (40%) were
women, and 9 (60%) were men. 6 out of 30 women won (20%), while 9 out of 30 men
won (30%). While men did win more often proportionally, these results were not found
to be significant, χ2 (1, n= 60) = .80, p =.37.
To discover the presence of significant factors that may have been associated with
the scores of male participants (n = 23), correlations were run between the scores of men
and other items from the study. Only 2 items were found to be significant. A fairly
strong correlation was found between score and PAQ item 13 (approval-seeking) which
was determined to be significant, r(22) = .49, p < .05. Additionally, a significant
moderate correlation was found between score and PAQ item 24 (handling pressure),
r(22) = .42, p < .05.
In searching for variables that may have been associated with the score of female
participants (n = 55), correlations were run between women’s scores and other items from
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the study. A significant moderate correlation was found between score and age, r(54) =
.30, p < .05. A significant moderate correlation was also found between score and PAQ
item 18 (ease of crying), r(54) = .29, p < .05. Another correlation of note was between
score and PAQ item 22 (relational warmth) which was very near significance, r(54) =
.26, p = .06. Finally, a notable correlation was found between score and PAQ item 3
(emotionality) which was not significant, r(54) = .20, p = .15.
A one-way MANOVA was run to determine significant differences for women’s
PAQ Item Scores, comparing scores for each item of women in mixed-sex groups (n =
27) with scores of women in same-sex groups (n = 28). No significant difference was
found overall, Wilks’ Ʌ = .51, F(24, 30) = 1.22, p > .05.
However, two items of note were identified, and independent samples t-tests were
conducted comparing the values of PAQ items 11 and 23 reported by women from the
mixed-sex groups (n = 27) with the values of such items reported by women in the samesex groups (n = 28). For PAQ item 11 (worldliness), a significant difference was found,
t(53) = 3.09, p < .01. Women in the mixed-sex condition (M = 1.19, SD = 1.04) reported
values for PAQ item 11 that were significantly different from those reported by women in
the same-sex condition (M = 2.07, SD = 1.09).
For PAQ item 23 (need for security), no significant difference was found, t(53) =
-1.76, p = .08. Women in the mixed-sex condition (M= 2.56, SD = .93) did not report
significantly different values for PAQ item 23 than did women in the same-sex condition
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(M = 2.11, SD = .96). However, the difference found for item 23 was close enough to
statistical significance to merit mention and provide structure for discussion.
The researcher posited that a negative correlation would be found between game
score and balanced actions ratio (the absolute value of masculine action ratio minus fifty).
It was believed that players who used a more balanced strategy in terms of choosing a
relatively equal number of masculine and feminine-typed actions would score higher.
The correlation run for all participants (n = 78) showed this not to be the case, r(77) =
.01, p > .05, one-tailed.
Correlation of these variables were run for women in mixed-sex groups alone (n =
27), with no significant correlation found, r(26) = -.09, p > .05, one-tailed. No significant
correlation was found for women in same-sex groups (n = 28), either, r(27) = -.05, p >
.05, one-tailed. Men in mixed-sex groups (n = 23) also were found to have no significant
correlation, r(22) = .19, p > .05, one-tailed.
Men in mixed-sex groups (n = 23) were actually found to have a notable
correlation in the opposite direction of that expected, although it, too, was not significant,
r(22) = .19, p = .20, one-tailed. With more men as participants, this may have been
demonstrated to be a significant correlation.
An independent samples t-test compared winners (n = 21) with non-winners (n =
56) to see if winners had lower balanced actions ratios. Winners (M = 28.73, SD = 18.31)
were not found to have significantly lower balanced actions ratios than non-winners (M =
32.81, SD = 17.85), t(75) = .89, p = .19, one-tailed.
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DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study was to discover whether stereotype threat occurred
during competitive interactive board games (such as Settlers of Catan), and whether
actions taken during the game were consistent with gender stereotypes and selfperception. It was believed that if stereotype threat did occur, women would be less
likely to take actions that were stereotypically masculine during a mixed-sex game than
they would during a same-sex game. The presence of men, as well as the brief
demographics questionnaire, were expected to have a subtle stereotype activation effect,
influencing women to conform to a role that matched the feminine stereotype.
In addition, femininity scores on the PAQ were expected to correlate positively
with the number of feminine actions taken during the game (relative to the total number
of feminine and masculine actions taken). The degree to which women chose femininetyped actions over actions that were masculine-typed was expected to be a reflection of
how much women perceived themselves as exhibiting stereotypically feminine qualities.
Attribute Differences
The MANOVA that was run for the demographics questionnaire and the PAQ did
not find women in mixed-sex groups to be significantly different from women in samesex groups overall. Women in both groups were found to have approximately equal
femininity scores. Women in mixed-sex groups did not have significantly lower game
scores than women in same-sex groups, though there was a downward tendency. The
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game scores of women in mixed-sex groups also did not vary significantly from the
scores of the men they played against.
For PAQ item 11, a highly significant difference was found between women in
mixed-sex groups and those in same-sex groups. Women in the mixed-sex condition
reported being more “home oriented” than women in the same-sex condition, and women
in same-sex groups reported being more “worldly” compared to women in mixed-sex
groups (though both reported values below the midpoint, closer to “very home oriented”).
The presence of men may have made women in mixed-sex groups more aware of their
gender, influencing them to report a more extreme answer favoring feminine stereotype
than women in same-sex groups. The same may have been true of PAQ item 23 (“need
for security”), in which a nearly significant difference was found between women in the
mixed-sex condition and those in the same-sex condition, with women from mixed-sex
groups reporting that they had a stronger need for security than those in same-sex groups.
Group Differences in Gender-typed Actions
Testing demonstrated that women in same-sex groups did not take more
masculine-typed actions relative to total stereotyped actions than did women in mixedsex groups. In fact, the complete opposite was found to occur (see Figure 1). Women in
mixed-sex groups had higher masculine action ratios than women in same-sex groups.
This means that women playing in groups with men were actually more aggressive and
risk taking than women who did not play against men.
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Likewise, women in same-sex groups were not found to take fewer femininetyped actions comparatively than women in mixed-sex groups. Once again, the reverse
was found (see Figure 2). Women who only played against other women took
significantly more feminine-typed actions comparatively than women who played against
men. This means that women in groups where men were absent were more cooperative,
nurturing, and support-seeking than women in mixed-sex groups.
Regarding women in mixed-sex groups, rather than conforming to feminine
gender stereotype, as expected, they seemed to try to blend in more with the men.
Likewise, women in same-sex groups, rather than feeling freer to express a variety of
actions without men around, appeared to conform more rigidly to feminine stereotype.
Indeed, there appears to have been some type of gender conformity occurring during
these games; but rather than conform to their own gender, the players seemed to conform
to the behavior of their fellow players.
Unfortunately, because this study did not include all-male groups, it is impossible
to say whether the behavior of men was changed due to the presence of women. Men
were not the targeted participants of this study, and there were more women to draw
participants from than men. Despite the lack of data from all-male groups, there are
some things that do imply that men had more impact on women than the reverse. For
example, the researcher noted on more than one occasion that men were slightly more
likely than women to take aggressive and risk-taking actions first (before a player of the
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other gender did), and doing so seemed to encourage the other players, including women,
to take such actions.
Men were also seen to take feminine-typed actions earlier than women, and they
were equally likely to select feminine-typed actions throughout the game as women they
played against were (in fact, with a larger sample, men may have been shown to take
significantly more feminine actions comparatively than the women they played against).
Women were more likely to choose gender-neutral actions first (such as Forage and
Purchase). Because of these things, it appears that women were following men rather
than men following women. Previous research has demonstrated that even in situations
of equal status and power, women tend to be more influenced by men than men are by
women (Eagly, 1983).
Strangely, when males chose a feminine-typed action, females did not seem more
likely to choose such actions thereafter. Women may have been following the men to
some extent, but beyond that, women were adhering to the masculine stereotype, perhaps
even overcompensating to such a degree that they played more masculinely than their
male opponents did (testing showed that in mixed-sex groups, women had higher
masculine action ratios than men, but having too few participants prevented significant
results; nevertheless, the results approached significance).
Masculine action ratios were not correlated with PAQ masculinity at all. This
means that the increased number of masculine actions taken by women in the mixed-sex
condition must have been related to something other than masculinity.

68
Perhaps women in mixed-sex groups chose to follow men because they saw men
as the dominant gender, or because they believed that the men were the superior players
and would beat them unless they played in a similar way to men. If this were the case,
then stereotype threat could not have been responsible, since it is mostly an unconscious
process and would have had the opposite effect; women experiencing stereotype threat
tend to conform to the feared stereotype (Quinn & Spencer, 2001). With many
competitive games, women tend to perform more poorly due to a lack of experience
(Blumberg & Sokol, 2004). Women may have simply recognized that they were less
experienced at playing complex board games than men, and attempted to play like men in
order to make up the difference. Assuming that the game was geared toward men, and
that the men would be more familiar with this type of game, following the men may have
seemed the best approach for the women.
It is also possible that women simply took an increasing variety of actions as new
actions were demonstrated, and since men tended to be more likely than women to
initiate the aggressive and risk-taking actions, the fact that the women were following the
men was circumstantial. If this were the case, then women may have felt some
discomfort or uncertainty that contributed to their tentative game-playing. They may
have been afraid to be the first one to take an action that helped or hindered an opponent,
or they may simply have not understood the gender-typed actions as well as the neutral
ones. Stereotype threat may not have taken place, but perhaps something akin to it did,
something that inhibited the actions of women such that they only felt sure, initially,
about taking simple actions that did not cause them to interact with other players.
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Whatever the case, it appears that taking more masculine actions was a wise move
on the part of women. Women who took more masculine actions generally scored
higher. A moderate correlation of was calculated for score and masculine action ratios of
women in mixed-sex groups; this was not determined to be significant, but it seems likely
that an increase in sample size would have gained significant results.
The small samples were the biggest limitation of this study, but were difficult to
avoid due to the lack of willing and qualifying participants and challenges due to the
design of the study, such as arranging meeting times of over an hour for 4 participants.
Further investigation with much larger samples would serve to demonstrate conclusively
whether, in a mixed-sex group, women’s performance increases as their relative number
of masculine-typed actions increases.
When examining all of the women in the study, no correlation was found between
masculine action ratio and game score. This is because the inclusion of women from the
all-female groups neutralized the results. Although women in same-sex groups
performed significantly less masculine actions than women in mixed-sex groups, their
game scores did not suffer. Choosing masculine actions seems to have played a role in a
player’s success in mixed-sex games, but appears to have not been a factor in games
consisting solely of women.
Game Scores and Winning
Women in mixed-sex groups were not found to have significantly lower game
scores than women in same-sex groups. There was, however, a small downward
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tendency, with women in mixed-sex groups having scores that were 1/3 of a point lower
than women in same-sex groups. It is likely that a larger study would have shown these
results to be significant. If something similar to stereotype threat did occur, then it may
have been responsible for this slight suffering in score.
Since winning players ended the game at the end of their turn, and thus, at times,
prevented other players from reaching the score they would have obtained had players
taken an equal number of turns, a partial correlation was run for score and masculine
action ratio of women in mixed-sex groups accounting for winners. A moderate
correlation of .27 was found that was significant at the p < .10 level. This indicates that
performing masculine actions was almost certainly a factor for women in mixed-sex
groups achieving higher scores.
Looking further at winners, women who won in mixed-sex groups had higher
masculine action ratios (a ratio of 3:1) than women who won in same-sex groups (a ratio
of about 1 ½:1); the difference was not shown to be significant, but was definitely
noteworthy. Again, this is a problem of sample size, and larger numbers of participants
would probably make the difference. Both means were over 50, which is the level at
which an equal number of masculine actions relative to feminine actions were taken (a
1:1 ratio).
This implies that the higher number of masculine actions performed by women in
mixed-sex groups contributed to their success, while the success of women who won in
same-sex groups did not depend on performing masculine actions. In corroboration of
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this, the correlation of game score and masculine action ratio for women in the same-sex
condition was nowhere near significance.
For men, performing masculine actions was even more integral to their success.
Male winners’ ratio of masculine to feminine actions was 3:1, which was substantially
higher than the same ratio of female winners, which was 2:1; this difference was not
determined to be significant, but there was definitely an upward tendency for the males.
The chi-squared test run for hypothesis 7 to see if men won more often than
women from mixed-sex groups found no significant lead, but did show that 54% of the
winners were men and 46 % were women. This statistic can be misleading, since it
includes all of the women winners but fails to include two of the men. This is because
two of the men who won were not normal participants, but substitutes, and none of the
substitutes who were women ever won a game.
A second chi-squared test, including substitutes, showed that of the winners, 60%
were men and 40% were women. This difference was still not significant, but was close
enough to imply that given more participants, the results would likely have proven
significant. Removing 2 of the winners from calculations, as was done in the first chisquared test, threw off the results. Including the substitutes in this calculation does not
seem inappropriate. Most of the substitutes were as clueless about the operations of the
experimental game, Frontier Town, as the regular participants were. Even though many
of them had familiarity with Settlers of Catan (the game from which the measure was
constructed), Frontier Town was different enough to offset any advantages their extra
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experience may have given them. The researcher attempted to amend any additional
imbalance by giving special instructions to the substitutes in private previous to playing,
encouraging them to take more of a variety of special actions than they might otherwise
take, and discouraging them from overly aggressive game play. The substitutes did not
appear to have any edge over the normal participants, as seems apparent from the fact
that out of the 14 substitutes used, only 2 of them won.
It seems clear that a trend existed in men winning mixed-sex games more often
than women did. It is unclear as to whether underperformance on the part of women was
connected with stereotype threat, though it is the researcher’s opinion that stereotype
threat did not occur—at least, not in the conventional sense. As stated earlier, women in
mixed-sex games seemed to be hesitant and inhibited, though any discomfort they may
have experienced did not drive them to conforming to gender stereotype. What women
experienced may have been evaluation apprehension. If they were concerned about
appearing weak, stupid, or inexperienced to the men, they may have modified their
behavior to try to appear more competent and assertive.
It is also possible that a different stereotype was primed, one that targeted “nerds”
or “geeks.” It is far more acceptable for men to be interested in nerdy things than
women, and women may have been afraid of revealing the fact that they were “game
board geeks” to men. If this were the case, then women who saw themselves as being
nerds may have underperformed due to the fear of negative evaluation by the men.
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Even though women who took more masculine actions in mixed-sex games had
higher game scores than those who took less, they still failed to rise above the scores of
men, as well as the scores of women in same-sex groups. Performing more masculine
actions only enabled the women in mixed-sex groups to be on-par with the men, and did
not give them any edge. So what did contribute to higher scores?
Significant moderate correlations were found between game score and age and
between score and PAQ item 18 (ease of crying). Another correlation of note was
between score and PAQ item 22 (relational warmth), which was very near significance.
A notable correlation was found between score and PAQ item 3 (emotionality) which
approached significance.
Women who were older had higher scores than those who were younger. This
may be because older women were more likely to have played complex board games in
the past. In addition, women who reported higher values on items 3, 18, and 22, and thus
perceived themselves as more emotional and warm, scored higher than those who
reported lower values. All of these attributes are strongly associated with feminine
stereotype. This supports the idea that women in same-sex groups excelled relative to
how feminine they were.
For male participants, only 2 items were found to have significant correlations
with game score: PAQ item 13 (approval-seeking) and PAQ item 24 (handling pressure),
both fairly strong correlations. It is easy to see how the latter could have contributed to
success on a competitive board game, but it is hard to say how approval-seeking fits in.
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Perhaps men who were more successful were also good at maintaining rapport with the
other players through gaining their approval in some way, and thus minimized their
chances of being targeted by aggressive actions.
PAQ Femininity and Feminine-typed Actions
Women who identified more strongly with their gender were expected to be more
susceptible to stereotype threat, and to therefore have higher feminine action ratios. As
anticipated, a significant correlation was found between PAQ femininity score and
feminine action ratios (see Figure 3). Women who took comparatively more feminine
actions scored higher on femininity than women who took less. This correlation
demonstrates compatibility between the PAQ and the design of the stereotyped actions
used in Frontier Town.
The question remains as to whether there is any causal relationship. The
researcher viewed PAQ femininity as a consistent attribute, and assumed that a woman
who had a higher feminine action ratio would also be shown to have higher femininity
when she took the PAQ after playing the game. The order of things was so set to prevent
PAQ responses from influencing game play. However, it is possible that the taking of
feminine-typed actions increased women’s adherence to their gender identity, thus raising
their PAQ score for femininity. It seems more likely that women who took more
feminine-typed actions also had higher scores on PAQ femininity because they identified
more strongly personally with feminine stereotype.
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Due to the fact that, in stereotype threat conditions, women are affected more
profoundly when they identify more with their gender (Schmader, 2002), women in
mixed-sex groups who had higher femininity scores were expected to show greater
performance decrements than women who scored lower on femininity. Game score was
expected to correlate negatively with PAQ femininity, but this was found not to be the
case.
It is interesting to note that the correlation between game score and femininity for
women in same-sex groups was more than twice as great as that for women in mixed-sex
groups, although neither had a significant correlation. The correlation for score and
feminine action ratio of women in same-sex groups was not found to be significant, but
was slightly higher than the correlation found between score and masculine action ratio.
These support the idea that femininity was more important in same-sex games, and more
feminine players were marginally more likely to do well.
Balanced Actions Ratio
The researcher surmised that among all the participants, those who had the
highest scores would also be those who had incorporated a balance of both feminine and
masculine stereotyped actions into their strategy. In examining this relationship for all
participants, no significant correlation was found. This demonstrates that using a balance
of both masculine and feminine actions was not a viable strategy for success in Frontier
Town. By extension, mixed-gender-typed strategies may be less effective in other
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complex board games than strategies that focus more on one type of gender-stereotyped
actions.
Men in mixed-sex groups were actually found to have a notable correlation in the
opposite direction of that expected, although it, too, was not significant. With more men
as participants, this may have been demonstrated to be a significant correlation. Winners
in general also appeared to have lower balanced actions ratios than non-winners, though
this difference was not shown to be significant. A larger sample was really needed.
Nevertheless, there is enough evidence to imply that men who were more aggressive and
risk-taking were probably more likely to win.
Bringing Women to the Table
Since gender remains constant throughout every situation, it is more than simply a
role (West & Zimmerman, 1987). Children take up new gender identities as they grow,
becoming “boys” and “girls” and learning to behave in ways that reinforce that
conception. Gender does not exist in a vacuum, and is not innate; it is situated in the
interactions of human beings, especially in expressing oneself as “feminine” or
“masculine”. Men who are not dominant enough, and women who are not submissive
enough, may each suffer some degree of social alienation, and be thought of as
inappropriate models of their sex. To vary from gender-stereotyped behavior is to risk
being perceived as failing to exhibit one’s “essential nature” (West & Zimmerman,
1987).
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Women can be exposed at an early age to competitive games, and encouraged to
play them as much as boys are. If women can be trained to no longer see playing a
complex board game as part of being a “boy”, then they will be more likely to participate
in such games and enjoy them. When the risk of violating one’s essential nature is
eliminated, then one can freely partake without stigmatization, regardless of gender.
People are aware that their behavior will be judged as masculine or feminine, and
act in a way that will reinforce their own identity (Deutsch, 2007). “Women act like
women because the positions they occupy require feminine behavior. Men act like men
because the social positions they occupy require competence, leadership, physical
strength, and autonomy. Presumably, then, change that results in more gender similarity
in social location should reduce gender difference and the perception of difference”
(Deutsch, 2007, pg. 114).
Gender differences can exist in gaming strategies without one gender’s style
being considered superior. Women who played mixed-sex games did better when they
applied a more masculine strategy, but such a strategy proved ineffective for women in
same-sex games. This shows that the setting in which a game is played can significantly
influence whether a masculine or a feminine strategy will be more effective. A femininetyped strategy can be even more effective than a masculine-typed one, given the right
situation.
One of the ways in which complex games can become friendlier to women is
through simple changes in phraseology. For example, in many games, the rules use the
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term “he” when speaking of a player generically; this assumes that all, or most, players
will be male. Language matters. The pervasive use of “he” in game rules is likely to do
what it has done in others areas of society: render women invisible (Deutsch, 2007).
Admittedly, using “he/she” can be awkward, and strict adherence to grammar prohibits
the use of the gender-neutral term “they” when speaking about an individual (although
such a practice is normal in spoken English throughout the U.S., it can cause some
confusion). There are other techniques that authors could use. One approach to the
problem that is becoming more common involves alternating the use of “he” and “she”
for each paragraph or example throughout the document.
In the researcher’s opinion, the biggest obstacle in more women joining men in
complex board games is the men themselves. Many men seem put-out by having to play
with a woman. Perhaps they do not want to deal with an inexperienced player, or to have
to worry about hurting the feelings of a more emotionally sensitive person (as women are
generally viewed to be), and thus be seen as a jerk by the woman and the other male
players. Whatever the case, if men will learn to put aside their fears and biases, and be
more welcoming to female players, the gaming world will change significantly. Having
women be a part of these activities can only make things better. After all, how can a man
think he’s “king of the hill” if he never lets a woman take a shot at him? Male players
who really want to test their expertise will be eager to invite women challengers to the
table who can provide them with more variation in game play and thus enhance the
overall experience.
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The Question of Stereotype Threat
Stereotype threat does not appear to have occurred during this study. This may
have been because the negative stereotype was not sufficiently intense to cause women to
respond to it, or because they did not believe that the negative stereotype applied to their
particular situation (Steele & Aronson, 1995). Also, the use of the demographics
questionnaire before the game to remind the participants of their gender and the mere
presence of men in the game may have been inadequate primers for stereotype threat.
But the primary reasons that stereotype threat may not have occurred are that the
participants were not under pressure (i.e., they did not feel that what they were doing was
any significant measure of their ability), and were not all interested or fully engaged in
the activity (Quinn & Spencer, 2001).
Conditions of stereotype threat are described as requiring a subject to be tested “at
the edge” of their ability; tests that are too easy leave little room for doubt (an essential
ingredient for negative cognition), and tests that are too difficult discourage the subject
from trying very hard. The subject also must find the material they are tested on
important to them; if they do not care about their performance on a board game, then
stereotype threat is unlikely to occur (Quinn & Spencer, 2001).
The fact that participants were inexperienced with the game, or any games of that
type, was a problem. Chess players are well-aware of the gender-bias that exists for their
sport, and a woman cannot play a game without the awareness that she may be judged
based on the negative gender stereotype (Maass et al., 2008). For women who had never
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played a complex board game, and were certainly never exposed to the larger gaming
culture, they may have been unaware of the existence of the negative stereotype. The
failure of women to react according to stereotype threat theory indicates that either the
game itself did not possess the qualities necessary to trigger the effect, or the stereotype
of men outperforming women on complex competitive board games was not widespread.
If women were ignorant of the stereotype, then they could blissfully escape the
detrimental effects of stereotype threat. The worst that may have occurred was a mild
apprehension stemming from their own inexperience and the possible belief that men are
more proficient at competitive games.
The perfect study would have used participants gathered at a large board gaming
convention, where players would be more likely to be aware of the stereotypes. It would
have involved all-male groups, and would have included larger samples, preferably n =
100 for men and women in both groups types, adding up to a total of 400 participants.
Nevertheless, even such a study would have its limitations, since there are still far fewer
women who attend such conventions compared to men, and many of the attendees would
be too busy with their own activities to spare time for an experiment. In addition, results
would not be readily generalizable to the general populace, but would apply primarily to
those who are part of the sub-culture of board gamers. Nevertheless, such a setting
would be optimal for recruiting participants who were well-aware of the gender
stereotypes in gaming. Women from game culture would be the most likely ones to
suffer from stereotype threat in a mixed-sex game, since gaming in general would be
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important to them, and their performance on a particular board game, and how well they
did (especially in relation to the men) would matter to them.
Women may have felt that the situation was not one in which their gender was
relevant. People are not constantly judging based on gender criteria; attention, selfinterest, exposure to counter-stereotypical thoughts, and efforts to avoid prejudice all
influence whether gender stereotyped judgments will be made (Blair & Banaji, 1996;
Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). Being cognitively active can also decrease the likelihood
of one’s mind accessing the idea of stereotypes and assessing their performance through
that lens (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991).
In addition, context can have a tremendous impact on the types of stereotypes that
are accessed. When multiple categorizations are available, people tend to unconsciously
choose the most salient stereotype to represent what they see (Macrae, Bodenhausen &
Milne, 1995). In a study by Blair (2002), participants accessed stereotypic traits for
femininity faster than traits for Chinese stereotype when they viewed a picture of a
Chinese woman using makeup; but when they saw a picture of the same Chinese woman
with chopsticks, they were quicker to access traits of Chinese stereotype than they were
to access traits of femininity.
Women in mixed-sex groups may have seen their male opponents not so much as
specimens of masculinity but more as fellow students and peers. The academic lens, and
not the lens of gender differences, may have been what they were looking through. If
that is the case, then they are to be applauded for their ability to engage in activities with
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the opposite sex without sexism becoming an issue, because sadly, doing so does not
come easily to many people.
Limitations and Further Study
As previously stated, the biggest limitation of this study was the small sample
size. The researcher had difficulty in recruiting participants due to a number of likely
reasons. One major reason may have been the length of the time needed for a student to
complete their participation in the study, which was about an hour and 15 minutes.
Another factor may have been study competition. Students usually participated in order
to fulfill class requirements or earn extra credit. When a student had the option of getting
the same amount of credit for participating in a study that required much less than an
hour, they may have been reluctant to opt for the more time-consuming option.
Additionally, although 78 students participated, the division into three groups decreased
the n of each group, providing less power for determining significant results. This was
unavoidable, as the design of the study required several groups.
The second big limitation was the relative lack of awareness of gender-based
stereotypes in competitive board games by the participants. The isolated nature of the
study site appears to have made it a poor choice for this particular study, since few of the
participants had any exposure to complex board games. A better choice may have been a
large city with greater diversity.
Regarding game theory, it should be noted that Settlers of Catan, and the version
used in this study, Frontier Town, are not zero-sum games. Because of this, concepts
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such as the Nash equilibrium do not apply as stringently. However, the related idea of an
external mediating device is still relevant regarding the distribution of power between
genders. For example, during Frontier Town, players who consistently chose Gamble (a
masculine-typed action) would usually see a considerable payout, whereas a change to
feminine-typed actions may prevent them from realizing as great a payout (based on
probability). At the same time, players who chose Request (a feminine-typed action)
regularly would build rapport with other players throughout the game and be able to trade
resources more effectively, whereas a shift toward masculine-typed actions may hurt their
rapport and diminish their trading power. Therefore, even in a non-zero-sum game, the
idea of adhering to a gender-based strategy to achieve success in response to an external
mediating device, such as personal gender, is applicable.
It is difficult to say how well the players actually understood the game, and
whether there was any difference in understanding based on gender or group type. A
simple measure of understanding employed after the game may have been profitable.
Game familiarity did not appear to be a factor, since many times, players with some
experience with Settlers of Catan would score very low; nevertheless, this element was
not examined closely during this study.
Participants may have selected actions based on actions taken by previous players.
There was no way to tell if a player’s action was followed by other players or responded
to in some other way. It is possible that some participants played “follow the leader” to
some extent, taking actions they had seen previous players take instead of performing an
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as-yet-unchosen action, or instead of selecting a Special Action based solely upon their
own circumstances or strategy. It may be useful to track how one player’s action affects
the actions chosen by subsequent players. Using a confederate who starts the game, and
varies their action each turn, might help show whether players are following the starting
player. Having players of both genders act as starting players in different games may
also show whether there is any difference in how much a leader of a particular sex is
followed.
One of the reasons that women may have won less often relative to men in mixedsex games is that the goals of each gender were different. Most men may have been
primarily focused on winning, but most women may have had another goal in mind.
Women may have invested more energy than men in being liked by the other players, not
doing anything mean to them, and not being embarrassed. These things could have
prevented them from achieving victory. Ascertaining players’ goals would serve to
understand elements that may detract from pursuing a winning score.
Another possible limitation has to do with the overall value of each of the Special
Actions. The Sabotage action that affected all other players may have had a hidden cost:
earning animosity from the other players. This could have resulted in an exchange of
hostility, as well as increased reluctance on the part of other players to conduct trade via
the Request action with the player who performed Sabotage. Players who realized this
may have avoided this action. The friendlier feminine-typed actions may have been the
surer road to victory for many players.
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There are numerous differences examined in this study that could be considerably
benefited by further research, especially research involving more participants than were
obtained in this study, and gathering participants in an area where gender-based
stereotypes are more ubiquitous. Some potential outcomes of further research are
verifying the role played by taking masculine-typed actions in a mixed-sex game, and
determining the occurrence and the cause of men scoring higher and winning more often
than the women they play against.
There were signs that some type of gender-based interference occurred during the
games, but there was no evidence of stereotype threat. The nature of this interference
would be useful to know (whether it is actually evaluation apprehension or something
gender-related) as would the conditions necessary for stereotype threat to actually occur
in competitive interactive games.
It is hoped, despite the failure of this study to demonstrate stereotype threat during
a board game, that those interested in reducing gender bias will take note of what this
study implies: harmful gender stereotypes can be found in many areas of life, even places
where people are meant to have fun and where competition is supposed to encourage
enjoyment, not discrimination. As steps are made toward making the playing of complex
board games an activity devoid of gender favoritism, more women will feel welcome to
explore a rich new world of intellectual activity and growth. Even the men will benefit,
because they will finally have the chance to spend time with women who understand the
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games they love the most, and they will finally be able to see how well they fare against
both genders instead of just one.
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APPENDIX A
Personal Attributes Questionnaire (Spence, Helmreich & Stapp, 1973)
Instructions:
The items below inquire about what kind of person you think you are. Each item consists
of a PAIR of characteristics, with the letters A-E in between. For example,
Not at all artistic

A......B......C......D......E

Very artistic

Each pair describes contradictory characteristics - that is, you cannot be both at the same
time, such as very artistic and not at all artistic.
The letters form a scale between the two extremes. You are to choose a letter which
describes where YOU fall on the scale. For example, if you think that you have no
artistic ability, you would choose A. If you think that you are pretty good, you might
choose D. If you are only medium, you might choose C, and so forth.
Circle the letter of your response for each item. Are you:

1.

Not at all aggressive

A.......B.......C.......D.......E

Very aggressive

2.

Not at all independent

A.......B.......C.......D.......E

Very independent

3.

Not at all emotional

A.......B.......C.......D.......E

Very emotional

4.

Very submissive

A.......B.......C.......D.......E

Very dominant

5.

Not at all excitable in a

A.......B.......C.......D.......E

Very excitable in a

major crisis

major crisis

6.

Very passive

A.......B.......C.......D.......E

Very active

7.

Not at all able to devote self

A.......B.......C.......D.......E

Able to devote self

completely to others

completely to others

8.

Very rough

A.......B.......C.......D.......E

Very gentle

9.

Not at all helpful to others

A.......B.......C.......D.......E

Very helpful to others

10.

Not at all competitive

A.......B.......C.......D.......E

Very competitive

11.

Very home oriented

A.......B.......C.......D.......E

Very worldly

12.

Not at all kind

A.......B.......C.......D.......E

Very kind
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13.

Indifferent to others

A.......B.......C.......D.......E

Highly needful of
others’ approval

approval
14.

Feelings not easily hurt

A.......B.......C.......D.......E

Feelings easily hurt

15.

Not at all aware of feelings

A.......B.......C.......D.......E

Very aware of feelings

of others
16.

Can make decisions easily

of others
A.......B.......C.......D.......E

Has difficulty making
decisions

17.

Gives up very easily

A.......B.......C.......D.......E

Never gives up easily

18.

Never cries

A.......B.......C.......D.......E

Cries very easily

19.

Not at all self-confident

A.......B.......C.......D.......E

Very self-confident

20.

Feels very inferior

A.......B.......C.......D.......E

Feels very superior

21.

Not at all understanding of

A.......B.......C.......D.......E

Very understanding of

others
22.

Very cold in relations with

others
A.......B.......C.......D.......E

others
23.

Very little need for security

Very warm in relations
with others

A.......B.......C.......D.......E

Very strong need for
security

24.

Goes to pieces under
pressure

A.......B.......C.......D.......E

Stands up well under
pressure
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Gender Role
Females
Feminine
Masculine
Androgynous
Undifferentiated
Males
Feminine
Masculine
Androgynous
Undifferentiated

Robbins
Study
%

Stoltzfus
Study
%
49%
6%
18%
27%

39%
20%
25%
15%

17%
22%
30%
30%

26%
32%
30%
12%

Schneidhofer, Schneidhofer,
1st Cohort
2nd Cohort
%
%
31%
33%
17%
23%
26%
22%
26%
22%
17%
28%
25%
30%

18%
23%
32%
27%
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Screening Questions
Please circle your answer for the following questions:
1. Have you ever played the board game Settlers of Catan?
Yes

No

Not sure

If yes:
2. How much experience would you say that you have at the game?
A lot

A moderate amount

3. How recently have you played it?
Within the last:
Year

More than 1 year

A little

Almost none
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Demographics Questionnaire
Please answer all of the following questions fully. Your answers are completely
confidential. The information you provide here will be linked to further information
associated with you gathered during this study, but there will be nothing connecting you
personally to the data. Information you provide that is presented to others in research
papers, conference presentations, or research publications will be made available in
aggregate form only. Your individual information will not be shared with anyone other
than the researchers, and will only be used for the purpose of research.
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You may choose not to
participate, or discontinue participating at any time, without penalty. You must be at least
18 years of age to participate in this study. If you have questions about this project, you
may contact the primary investigator, Paul Robbins, at pprobbins@mail.fhsu.edu, or Dr.
Carol Patrick of the FHSU Psychology Department, who is supervising this research, at
(785) 628-4406 or cpatrick@fhsu.edu.

1. What is your age? ____
2. What is your biological sex? Please circle one:

Female

Male

3. What is your ethnicity? Please circle one:
Asian

White

Black

Latino

Native American
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Pacific Islander

Other (please

specify):____________________________________
4. Are you currently enrolled at FHSU? Please circle one:
5. What is your major/graduate program? Please
specify:___________________________

Yes

No
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Frontier Town
Game Description
This is a competitive strategy board game designed to measure the number of actions
taken by a player that are stereotypically considered masculine, feminine, or gender neutral
during game play. The researcher supervising each game will record the relevant action chosen
by each player during their turn. This is done simply by marking a tally in the appropriate box
(see sample sheet below). This is an example of how actions would be recorded for 12 rounds of
play.
Player ID
Action

1M

1F

Request (F)

||

||

Gamble (M)

||||

|||

Forage (N)

||

Donation (F)

|||

Sabotage (M)

2M

2F
||||

|||

||

||

||

||||

|||

|

|||

Purchase (N)

|

||

||||

|

Total Actions

12

12

12

12
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Each board will be set up the same way, with city pieces already placed on the board in
such a manner as to give each player a relatively equal advantage.
During the experimental set-up, players are seated so that following one player’s turn the
next player will be of the opposite sex. Each player rolls a die, re-rolling ties for highest. The
player who rolled the highest number goes first, and will use the blue pieces. The other player of
the same gender will be the third player, and will use the white pieces. The two players of
opposite gender to the winner must roll again. The highest of them goes second, using the red
pieces, and the other goes fourth, using the green pieces.
During the control set-up, players are seated according to how high their first roll is, with
highest going first (tied players must re-roll against each other). The first player is blue, the
second red, the third white, and the fourth green.
Starting cards will consist of one card of each resource type that corresponds to the hexes
that the player’s starting city is adjacent to. A forage pile will be available, which consists of five
cards of each resource shuffled together and placed in a pile face down. A new one will be made
if it is ever exhausted.
During the game, each player is trying to earn 10 points to win. This is done by
constructing settlements on the board and upgrading them to cities. The small building pieces are
settlements, and each one is worth 1 point. Each large building piece, or city, is worth 2. In order
to win the game, all of a player’s building pieces must be connected to the others by roads during
their turn, and they must have reached 10 points.
At the beginning of the game, each player has one city already on the board. Each player
may place one road for free in any direction next to their city. A building piece can only be
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placed on a vertex of a hex tile (the point), and a road can only be built along an edge of a hex
(the side).
At the start of their turn, a player rolls the dice. If a 7 is rolled, any player who has more
than 7 gold must return one of them to the bank; the dice are then rolled until a number other than
7 comes up, and production occurs normally.
When any other number is rolled, any hex with a number chit that is the same as the
number rolled produces the resource card of its type for all players who have an adjacent building
piece. Resource cards are taken from the bank, which consists of two piles of cards of each
resource type in the center of the table. As long as a building is standing normally, it produces
normally; if it is sabotaged and ends up on its side, it does not produce anything. When one of the
numbers is rolled of a hex you have built on, each settlement produces one resource (brick, wood,
ore, sheep, or wheat); each city produces one resource, plus one gold. Only cities allow the
production of gold. Any building pieces not standing upright do not count toward production. At
any time, a player may return one of their buildings to an upright position at a cost of one sheep
per settlement and one ore per city. Also, at the end of their turn, a player may return one of their
buildings to an upright position for free.
For an example of resource production, in the situation below, assume that a 5 was rolled.
The green player would produce one ore and one gold, and the white player would produce one
brick and one gold. This is due to the position of their cities, which are adjacent to mountains
(which produce ore) and hills (which produce brick). Red and blue would produce nothing, since
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they are not yet built adjacent to a “5”.

This shows the locations of starting cities with possible road positions.

A player’s hand may not have more than 10 cards in it when their turn ends. If a player
has more than 10 cards at the end of their turn, they must discard cards until they have no more
than 10. Gold is not part of a player’s hand, and cannot be stolen (however, as mentioned earlier,
a player loses half of their gold if they have 8 or more and a 7 is rolled). Gold cannot be traded
(such as during the Request action).
During their turn, a player may return 3 of the same card type to the bank and take from
the bank any 1 resource card of another type. They may do this as many times as they wish
during a single turn.
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Immediately following production, a player must perform a special action. Some actions
require gold while others do not. Gold is paid back to the bank.
One of the actions, Request, allows a player to gain a card from another player or trade
cards with a player. They do this by requesting a specific resource card from the other players.
They may also offer their own unwanted card in exchange to sweeten the deal. They may offer
or receive multiple cards in a trade, but may only make one trade with one other player. If the
other player does not take any cards in the trade, that player receives one gold from the bank for
their willingness to give.
Here is an example of trade dialogue (all other players may only address player 1, the
active player):
Player 1 (active player): “Is anyone willing to give me a sheep?”
Player 2: “I have a sheep, but do you have anything to trade me?”
Player 1: “I can offer you a wood.”
Player 2: “I don’t really want wood. How about brick?”
Player 1: “Sorry, I need my brick.”
Player 3: “I’ll give you a sheep for one ore AND one wood.”
Player 1: “That’s asking a lot.”
Player 4: “Here’s a sheep. I’ll take your wood.”
Player 1: “Okay. Thanks.”
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Player 1 then takes a sheep from Player 2 and gives her a wood.
Following their special action, a player may also build any number of things that they
have enough resources for. Resources are returned to the bank.
Costs are as follows:
Road = 1 wood, 1 brick
Settlement = 1 wood, 1 brick, 1 wheat, 1 sheep
City = 2 wheat, 3 ore
A settlement is upgraded to a city, and the city replaces it. A settlement must be built
first before it can be upgraded to a city. A new settlement need be only one road away from any
other building piece, but a player may build numerous roads before building a settlement, if they
are trying to reach a further location.
Special Actions:
0 gold:
Request—Ask the other players for a specific resource card. If more than one player
offers it to you, you may choose which to take from (they may offer additional
cards, if they wish; you can also ask for more, especially if multiple players are
competing for the offer). A player willing to give you what you ask for may also
request a card from you in trade (you don’t have to, but if you don’t, they may
not give you what you want). The player you take the card(s) from receives
one gold from the bank if they do not take any cards from you. You may
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only select one player’s offer. If no player is able and willing to offer you the
card you ask for, take one gold from the bank. (Gold cannot be traded.) (supportseeking, cooperation)
Gamble—Roll a die. 1: you receive nothing. 2 or 3: steal a card at random from a
player of your choice. 4 or 5: take one resource of your choice from the bank. 6:
take three resources of your choice from the bank. (risk-taking, aggression)
Forage—Draw a random resource from the forage pile. (general self-improvement)
1 gold:
Donation—Give a card to the player with the least points (other than you). If players are
tied for lowest score, choose one. Take a card of your choice from the bank.
(The gold you pay in goes to the bank, not the player.) (nurture, cooperation)
Sabotage (targeted)—Choose a player. That player must remove one of their roads OR
turn one of their building pieces on its side (their choice). (aggression)
2 gold:
Sabotage (widespread)—Each other player must remove one of their roads OR turn one
of their building pieces on its side (their choice). (aggression)
3 gold:
Purchase—Take one resource of your choice from the bank. (general self-improvement)
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Frontier Town
Game Rules
1 Roll the Dice
The respective terrain hexes produce resources. If a 7 is rolled, each player with
more than 7 gold must return half of their gold to the bank (rounded down); the dice are
then rolled until a number other than 7 comes up, and production occurs normally.

2 Special Action
0 gold:
Request—Ask the other players for a specific resource card. If more than one
player offers it to you, you may choose which to take from (they may offer
additional cards, if they wish; you can also ask for more, especially if
multiple players are competing for the offer). A player willing to give you
what you ask for may also request a card from you in trade (you don’t
have to, but if you don’t, they may not give you what you want). The
player you take the card(s) from receives one gold from the bank if
they do not take any cards from you. You may only select one player’s
offer. If no player is able and willing to offer you the card you ask for,
take one gold from the bank. (Gold cannot be traded.)
Gamble—Roll a die. 1: you receive nothing. 2 or 3: steal a card at random from
a player of your choice. 4 or 5: take one resource of your choice from the
bank. 6: take three resources of your choice from the bank.
Forage—Draw a random resource from the forage pile.
1 gold:
Donation—Give a card to the player with the least points (other than you). If
players are tied for lowest score, choose one. Take a card of your choice
from the bank. (The gold you pay in goes to the bank, not the player.)
Sabotage (targeted)—Choose a player. That player must remove one of their
roads OR turn one of their building pieces on its side (their choice).
2 gold:
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Sabotage (widespread)—Each other player must remove one of their roads OR
turn one of their building pieces on its side (their choice).
3 gold:
Purchase—Take one resource of your choice from the bank.
3 Building
Road (0 points) = 1 wood, 1 brick
Settlement (1 point) = 1 wood, 1 brick, 1 wheat, 1 sheep
City (2 points) = 2 wheat, 3 ore (turns a settlement into a city)
A new settlement need be only one road away from any other building piece, but
a player may build numerous roads before building a settlement, if they are trying to
reach a further location. When placing a new settlement or road, each must be connected
to other pieces on the board that belong to that player.

4 Free Recovery
If you have any sideways buildings, you may return one of them to an upright
position. It produces once more.

Additional Rules of Note
Non-Production—Any building pieces not standing upright (due to sabotage) do not
count toward production.
Building Recovery—At the start of any player’s turn, before the dice are rolled, a player
may return one of their buildings to an upright position at a cost of one sheep per
settlement and one ore per city.
Building Recovery At Start of Any Turn:
Settlement = 1 sheep
City = 1 ore
Hand Limit—A player’s hand may not have more than 10 cards in it when their turn
ends. If a player has more than 10 cards at the end of their turn, they must discard cards
until they have no more than 10. Gold is not part of a player’s hand, and cannot be
stolen.
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Maritime Trade—During a player’s turn, the player may return 3 of the same card type to
the bank and take from the bank any 1 resource card of another type. The player may do
this any number of times during a single turn.
To Win—The game ends when one player reaches 10 points, with each of that player’s
settlements and cities connected by roads. The winning player’s buildings need not be
upright to count as points. Ranking is determined according to each player’s score at
game end.
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APPENDIX H
Debriefing Form
Gender-based Stereotype Threat and Competitive Interactive Games
The purpose of this study is to ascertain the effects of stereotype threat during competitive games.
Stereotype threat is the risk of being rated based on a stereotype (usually negative), and often
results in diminished performance. For example, in a study by Maass, D’Ettole, & Cadinu
(2008), participants played several games of chess online. Women who were aware that they
played against men dropped in performance. Women who were falsely informed that their male
opponent was a woman showed no deficit in performance.
It is believed that women will perform less actions perceived as aggressive, dominating, or risktaking (stereotypically masculine qualities) during a game with men than they will during a game
with other women only. It is also believed that this effect will be pronounced in women who
score higher on femininity in the PAQ.
Thank you for your participation.
If you have any question about this study, feel free to ask. You may contact any of the
individuals listed below.
Paul Robbins
Supervising Researcher
pprobbins@mail.fhsu.edu
Dr. Carol Patrick
Faculty Research Advisor
cpatrick@fhsu.edu
785-628-4406
Dr. Janett Naylor
Ethics Chair in Psychology
jmnaylor@fhsu.edu
785-628-5857
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